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I. INTRODUCTION
HE North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) created the
world's largest regional economic bloc when it was signed in 1992.1
The ink on NAFTA was barely dry before pleas for expansion of
the free trade pact led to concentrated negotiations for greater economic
liberalization within the hemisphere. At the 1994 Summit of the Ameri-
cas, held in Miami, Florida, thirty-four heads of state from Latin America
agreed to initiate a formal negotiation process aimed at completing a Free
Trade Area of the Americas agreement by 2005.2 As NAFTA's first dec-
ade nears its end, it has become critically important for North American
trade representatives to address a variety of challenges prior to conclud-
ing an expansive Free Trade Agreement of the Americas.3
1. North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the
Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the United
States of America, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) (Signed by the Heads of State of each of
the three countries on December 17, 1992 [hereinafter NAFTA or the Free Trade
Agreement].
2. The 1994 declaration to engage in negotiations to establish a Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FrAA) was reaffirmed in the Second Summit of the Americas
Declaration of Santiago (Apr. 19, 1998) (where Heads of State and Governments
reaffirmed their "determination to conclude the negotiation of the FTAA no later
than 2005, and to make concrete progress by the end of the century"), as well as at
the Fifth Ministerial Meeting held in Toronto, Canada, in November 1999; see Fifth
Trade Ministerial Meeting, Free Trade Area of the Americas Declaration of Minis-
ters, 6 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. Am. 471 (2000).
3. Although NAFrA was signed by the leaders of the Governments of Canada, Mex-
ico, and the United States in December, 1992, the provisions of the Agreement did
not take effect until it had been ratified by each Member State. NAIFTA came into
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NAFTA's failure to implement effective tax integration within North
America complicates the free flow of goods and services across borders.4
The current tax treatment of cross-border transactions within North
America often proceeds without reference to the basic tenets of NAFTA.
Moreover, the advent of electronic commerce challenges the efficacy of
certain aspects of the Free Trade Agreement.5 Electronic commerce
challenges the practical benefits of trade agreements that are preoccupied
with the exchange of physical goods and services. Furthermore, the
growth of the digital economy has exacerbated the difficulties arising out
of the application of outdated and disharmonious tax rules in a liberalized
trade environment.
This article starts by considering the interaction of tax policy, free trade
agreements, and electronic commerce. Part II introduces the primary
objectives of trade liberalization and reviews the trade policy develop-
ments that led to the signing of NAFTA. The concepts of mutual advan-
tage and harmonization, as well as other core trade principles, are
discussed within the taxation framework set out in the monumental
North American Free Trade Agreement. Review of NAFTA's history
and its objectives allows for improved evaluation of the feasibility and,
indeed, the desirability of extending the scope of the continental Free
Trade Agreement to encompass all or part of the Americas.
Part III explores the interdependence between tax treaties and interna-
tional trade policies.6 The NAFTA objective of harmonization infers in-
tegration of national taxation and trade policies. Ambiguous or
contradictory tax rules create artificial biases and uncertainty for interna-
tional transactions.7 An argument will be made that prevailing interna-
tional tax rules detract from the paramount principles of mutual
force on January 1, 1994. Therefore, the first decade where NAFrA governed the
continental trade of goods and services will be fully completed on December 31,
2003.
4. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Tax Integration Under NAFTA: Resolving the Conflict Be-
tween Economic and Sovereignty Interests, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 69 (1998) (not-
ing that the absence of tax integration in NAFTA could have various adverse long
term effects).
5. See generally J. Barrett Willingham, Electronic Commerce and the Free Trade Area
of the Americas, 6 NAFrA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. 483 (2000) (where it is indicated
that the FrAA needs to expressly respond to the e-commerce issues that have
emerged since NAFTA was signed).
6. How policymakers weigh the importance of the interdependence of tax and trade
issues will materially affect whether individuals, firms, countries and the world as a
whole will benefit from free trade negotiations and the wealth of information tech-
nologies. Catherine L. Mann, Balancing Issues and Overlapping Jurisdictions in
the Global Electronic Marketplace: The UCITA Exanple, 8 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y
215 (2002) (exploring how the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
traces the tension of policymaking in an increasingly global, digital and informa-
tion-based marketplace).
7. Mauricio Monroy, Harmonizing the Mexican Tax System with the Goals of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 739, 740
(1998) (claims that "[f]ree trade is stifled by the presence of adverse tax policies,
high tax rates on cross-border transactions, situations that cause double taxation,
and uncertainty due to the lack of adequate rules governing international
transactions.").
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advantage and harmonization that form the basis of ongoing free trade
negotiations.8 The merits of this proposition will be considered using a
detailed analysis of certain international income tax rules adopted by Ca-
nada, Mexico, and the United States. Since each of these countries are
signatories to NAFTA, the lack of congruous income tax treatment of
multinational business transactions challenges the efficacy of a continen-
tal free trade pact.
. Part IV of this article reviews how the emergence of electronic com-
merce serves to exacerbate the difficulties encountered by tax authorities
that seek to apply conflicting tax rules in an increasingly global and digi-
tal marketplace. The interdependence of tax and trade rules is embodied
in the continuing free trade debate regarding electronic commerce. The
resolution of issues regarding the taxation of electronic commerce will
have important implications on the direction and growth of trading rela-
tions. The existing disparities in the production and use of information
technologies across the Americas could detrimentally impact the treasur-
ies of the parties to the Free Trade Agreement if prevailing tax rules are
maintained. Free trade negotiators need to adopt equitable and neutral
rules for the taxation of electronic commerce in order to prevent revenue
losses that could further a "digital divide" between trading nations.9
Part V concludes with proposals that emphasize the need for gradual
harmonization of continental tax and trade rules. A multilateral tax
agreement involving Canada, Mexico, and the United States could be
used to promote the NAFL'A objectives of mutual gain and uniformity of
treatment. Considerable emphasis must be given to the importance of
tax integration as an adjunct to continuing continental free trade negotia-
tions, particularly against the backdrop of the growth of digital com-
merce. If NAFTA or the prospective Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas is to govern trade in an increasingly digital environment, then
e-commerce must be governed by clear, harmonious, and mutually ad-
vantageous tax measures in the same manner as traditional modes of
commerce.10
8. The argument that bilateral tax conventions create duplicitous, unnecessary, and
ineffectual barriers to international trade in goods and services builds upon the
proposition established in Cockfield, supra note 4, at 40 ("that the movement to-
ward freer regional trade and investment under NAFTA ought to be comple-
mented by the gradual harmonization of North American tax regimes.").
9. The term "digital divide" refers to the disparity or gap between countries and indi-
viduals that have access to information technologies and electronic commerce and
those countries and individuals that do not. For discussion as to the need to over-
come the digital divide between countries, see J.M. Spectar, Bridging the Global
Digital Divide: Frameworks for Access and the World Wireless Web, 26 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 57 (2000). To review a political plan that purports to ad-
dress the disparity of access to information technologies within the United States,
see The White House, THE CLINTON-GORE ADMINISTRATION: FROM DIGITAL Di-
VIDE TO DIGITAL OPPORTUNrIY, Feb. 2,2000, available at http://www.digitaldivide.
gov/2000-02-02.html [hereinafter CLINTON-GORE].
10. In a previous article, I argued for the need to reform international tax rules for
electronic commerce in a manner that adhered to accepted tax policy principles of
neutrality and inter-nation equity. See Aldo Forgione, Clicks and Mortar: Taxing
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II. REVISITING NAFTA - A DECADE LATER
The North American Free Trade Agreement completes its first decade
on December 31, 2003. NAFTA came about as a result of a special blend
of historical antecedents. The Governments of Canada, Mexico and the
United States entered into NAFTA in order to eliminate distortions to
continental trade. More than any other international trade agreement,
NAFTA symbolized a revolutionary step towards acceptance of the eco-
nomic possibilities of the time. The Free Trade Agreement was made
possible due to unusual political conditions and the implied acceptance
by each of the three countries of their respective roles in trade and geo-
political relations in the region and the world." This part reviews some
of the objectives and trade principles espoused by NAFTA as well as the
international tax and trade developments that took place in the Member
States during the first ten years of the Free Trade Agreement.
A. OBJECrIVES OF THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
NAFTA was heralded as the beginning of a new era of economic coop-
eration and trade amongst the nations of North America. The Preamble
to NAFIA promotes the concepts of mutual advantage and harmoniza-
tion of treatment as fundamental components of the reciprocal trade rela-
tions of the signatories to the Free Trade Agreement.12 For the first time
ever, a relatively poor developing country agreed to open its economy
and expose its businesses to unprecedented competition with two indus-
trialized countries. The Free Trade Agreement sought to overcome con-
cerns regarding the impact of economic disparities between its Member
States by establishing clear and harmonized rules that would promote
mutually advantageous trade flows within North America. This section
will explore how from its complex origins, NAIFTA strove to fulfil its ob-
jective of harmonization of trade rules and the promise of mutual gain for
each of its signatories.
1. Mutual Advantage
"Any new pattern of economic relations must ensure the mutuality of
benefits. A plan which concentrates all or most of the economic gain
Multinational Business Profits in the Digital Age, 26 SEATrLE UNIv. L. REv. 719
(2003) ("Income from e-commerce ("clicks") should be treated in a similar man-
ner to traditional business income ("mortar").").
11. For discussion of how the circumstances and changes that accompanied NAFTA
profoundly impacted trade negotiations throughout the Americas, see Sergio Lo-
pez-Ayllon, Mexico's Expanding Matrix of Trade Agreements -A Unifying Force? 5
NAFTA: L. & Bus. Rav. AM. 241, 242 (1999).
12. The Preamble to NAFIA states that the parties to the Agreement are resolved to,
among other things, establish rules that promote "clear and mutually advanta-
geous trade, and assur[e] a predictable commercial framework for business plan-
ning and investment." The objectives set out in the Preamble, which represent
resolutions undertaken by the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United
States, are meant to "inspire the entire text of NAFTA." See Monroy, supra note
7, at 740.
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in one party and all or most of the economic sacrifice in another, can-
not be expected to endure. ",'3
NAFTA was the first comprehensive free trade agreement concluded
between two of the most developed economies in the world, the United
States and Canada, and a much less developed country, Mexico. NAFTA
challenged the notion that a developing country could not benefit from a
reciprocal trade agreement involving wealthy and industrialized nations.
Soon after the commencement of continental trade negotiations, it be-
came clear that Mexico had to overcome huge economic and investment
disparities if it was to participate on a reciprocal level in its trade relations
with the United States and Canada.' 4 NAFTA was presented as a way to
provide economic gains to a poor country while alleviating the disparity
among the trading nations in the bloc.15 Based on the premise that there
is a positive correlation between free trade and economic development,
mutually advantageous trade rules could serve to narrow the gap between
poor and rich countries. 16
One of the most important criteria for determining the success of
NAFFA is whether the historic Free Trade Agreement was able to
achieve its ambitious objective of mutual advantage for its Member
States. . Basically, has NAFTA contributed to or promoted the fiscal
well-being of each of its parties during its first decade? While we may not
yet have a definitive reply to this critical question, it appears that the
governments of the NAFTA signatories are pleased with the economic
progress made by their respective nations. The economic performance of
the United States during NAFTA's first decade was extremely strong and,
according to its primary trade representative, the Free Trade Agreement
13. Opening statement of Senator Sarbanes, Joint Economic Committee-Hearing
Before the Congress of the United States, reprinted in AmERICAN ECONOMIC POL-
icIEs TOwARD MEXICO AND LATIN AMERICA 2 (Sept. 17, 1990).
14. In 1991, before the Free Trade Agreement was concluded, the levels of North
American trade (measured in U.S. Dollars) were as follows: U.S.-Canada, $143
billion; Mexico-U.S., $64 billion; and Mexico-Canada, $3 billion. More indicative
of the economic power imbalance faced by Mexico was the fact that U.S. direct
investment in Mexico amounted to $11.6 billion in 1991, while Mexican direct in-
vestment in the United States amounted to only $0.6 billion. By comparison, U.S.
investment in Canada at that time amounted to $68.5 billion, but the amount of
reciprocal Canadian investment in the U.S. reached $30 billion in 1991. See Dean
C. Alexander, The North American Free Trade Agreement An Overview, 11 INT'L
TAX & Bus. LAW. 48,49 (1993).
15. "The NAFTA approach, of a conventional free trade area supplemented by invest-
ment, services and carefully delimited temporary entry provisions (instead of full
labor mobility), could prove more flexible in facilitating regional economic inte-
gration when countries have different income levels." Murray Smith, The North
American Free Trade Agreement: Global Impacts, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND
THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 85 (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds.,
1993).
16. "Developing countries that have been most open to trade have had the fastest
growth, reducing global inequality; those least integrated into global markets, such
as many African economies, have remained among the world's poorest." Nancy
Birdsall, Life is Unfair: Inequality in the World, 111 FOREIGN POL'Y 76, 85 (1998)
(indicating that liberalized trade and economic integration reduce inequality and
foster economic growth).
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provided important contributions to this economic success. 17 Canadian
trade authorities report that that "since 1994, investment in NAFTA
countries has been dynamic" leading to mutual gains in employment and
increased trade.18 By several accounts, Mexico has derived the greatest
proportion of economic benefits from the Free Trade Agreement. 19
NAFTA's promise of mutual advantage for each of its members has
been trumpeted as the basis for the expansion of the Free Trade Agree-
ment to Latin American nations.20 However, it is unclear whether the
trade liberalization movement that swept the Americas in the 1990s has
provided any material improvements in the economic welfare of most
Latin Americans. Many countries in Central and South America shifted
to open trading policies as exemplified by the proliferation of regional
17. In her 2000 Report, Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, United States Trade Rep-
resentative, indicated that U.S. foreign trade policy, in general, and NAFIA, in
particular, contributed largely to the following achievements: a 55% expansion of
American goods and services exports since 1992 to $958.5 billion in 1999; U.S.
economic growth of $2.1 trillion or 28.7% from $7.2 trillion in 1992 to $9.3 trillion
in 1999; U.S. employment growth of approximately twenty-one million jobs, with
unemployment levels dropping from 7.3% to 4.1% in 2000 being the lowest unem-
ployment rate since January 1970; rising American living standards as hourly
wages for non-supervisory workers increased 6.2% since NAFTA took effect; U.S.
non-residential business investment increased by 10.4% per year from 1994; and,
since 1992, U.S. industrial growth increased 40.5% with growth in manufacturing
production accounting for an additional $400 billion (by comparison, Germany's
total industrial growth in the same period was only 6.3% and Japan's 3.6%).
"Since the NAFTA, trade among the three signatories has expanded by more than
85%, including goods export growth of $76 billion to Canada, and $46 billion to
Mexico. Since 1998, Mexico has been our second largest trading partner after Ca-
nada." Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, United States Trade Representative,
Testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
State, The Judiciary and Related Agencies (Apr. 5, 2000), 2000 WL 365138
F.D.C.H.
18. According to figures compiled by the Canadian government, NAFTA has corre-
sponded with the creation of more jobs in each of the Member States: employment
up 28% in Mexico; up 16% in Canada; and an increase of 12% in the United States
from January, 1994 levels. Furthermore, since 1994, the United States has doubled
the amount of trade with Mexico and Canada; Canadian trade to the region in-
creased over 109% during that period; and Mexican trade to the U.S. and Canada
exploded by over 238% from its 1994 level. See Canada-Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade, NAFTA AT SEVEN: BuILDING ON A NORTH
AMERiCAN PARTNERSHIP [hereinafter NAFTA AT SEVEN], available at http://www.
dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/nafta 7-en.asp (last visited July 8, 2003).
19. Mexico's rates for job creation (employment increase of 28% over first seven
years) and trade growth (up over 238%), according to NAFTA at Seven, id., were
considerably higher than comparable figures in the United States and Canada. Of
course, Mexico started the 1990s with the standard of living of a developing coun-
try so percentage gains based on a relatively low base are not necessarily indicative
of major economic gains for Mexico. Nonetheless, the Government of Mexico has
embraced the mantle of trade liberalization as a key component of its plan for
economic prosperity. Mexico has now signed thirty-two separate free trade agree-
ments. See Mexico Trade Background, at http://www.ftaa-alca.org.
20. At the Summits of the Americas in Miami and Santiago it was declared that the
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) would eliminate tariffs and non-tariff
barriers to trade in goods and services throughout the Hemisphere and establish a
single set of rules for fair trade in the region in order to promote "shared prosper-
ity and mutual benefit." Barshefsky, supra note 17.
520 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS - [Vol. 9
trade agreements and the multiplicity of declarations and commitments
to the creation of the FTAA.21 However, the economic performances of
the nations in the region varied considerably during the past decade.
Whereas the economies of Argentina, Chile, and Peru enjoyed growth at
an annual rate of roughly 5 percent for most of the 1990s, countries like
Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela lost or failed to gain
ground during that period. Moreover, the 1990s represented the second
consecutive decade during which the entire region's GDP growth per
capita was less than 1.5 percent, "leaving most Latin Americans almost as
poor in 2000 as they were in 1980. ' '22
Even where free trade contributed to economic growth and an im-
provement in the average standard of living, the evidence suggests that
the disparity between richest and poorest members of society increased
throughout Latin America during the first decade of the Free Trade
Agreement. Latin America currently suffers the worst income disparities
of any region in the world surpassing those of even sub-Saharan Africa.23
The ratio of income of the top 20 percent of earners to the bottom 20
percent is an average of sixteen to one in Latin America compared to
about ten to one in the United States and about five to one in Western
Europe.24 These income disparities are especially disheartening as they
accompany a period of unparalleled democratization and free trade in
Latin America.
Taxation represents an essential mechanism for the amelioration of in-
come disparities within a nation. In addition to its redistributive objec-
tives, income tax revenues are often relied upon by governments
tofinance infrastructure projects, promote economic growth, and to im-
prove productivity. Tax measures constitute an essential ingredient in
the promotion of domestic social policies. Therefore, taxation represents
a critical fiscal tool for the alleviation of economic disparities that arise as
a result of a liberalized trading regime.25
21. For a listing of regional trade agreements involving countries in North and South
America and other information regarding the Free Trade Area of the Americas, at
http://www.ftaa-alca.org.
22. See Peter Hakim, Is Latin America Doomed to Failure? 117 FOREIGN POL'Y 104,
106 (2000) (noting that despite Latin America's economic restructuring and trade
policy reforms, the economic performance in many Latin American countries fell
short of expectations).
23. Id. (noting that "inequalities of income and wealth are worsening almost every-
where" in the region. In 2000, more than half of Latin America's national income
went to only one-seventh of the population).
24. Brazil has the dubious distinction of the largest disparity in the world at approxi-
mately 25 to 1. Another disturbing trend involves the measure of the wage gap
between skilled and unskilled workers, which increased in the 1990s by more than
30% in Peru, 20% in Colombia, and nearly 25% in Mexico. Ironically, these coun-
tries enjoyed the greatest wage increases in Latin America during that period.
Hunter R. Clark & Amanda Velazquez, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin
America: Nicaragua - A Case Study, 16 Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 743, 754-55 (2001).
25. See Brian J. Arnold, Jacques Sasseville, and Eric M. Zolt, Summary of the Proceed-
ings of an Invitational Seminar on Taxation of Business Profits Under Tax Treaties,
50 CAN. TAX J. 1979, 1981-83 (2002) (noting that trade globalization has increased
the importance of corporate income tax revenues, especially for developing coun-
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On an international level, tax rules and principles provide a mechanism
for the flow of revenues between nations. Since the United States, Ca-
nada, and Mexico each provide unilateral relief from double taxation in
their domestic tax regimes, the division of tax claims between treaty part-
ners is a significant determinant in the allocation of tax revenues among
the countries in the North American trading bloc. Bilateral tax treaties
offer the means by which a nation can gain a fiscal advantage over its
treaty partner.26 In so far as NAFTA defers jurisdiction over tax mea-
sures to bilateral tax treaties involving its Member Nations, the Free
Trade Agreement allows some fiscal matters to trump the objective of
mutual advantage that is supposed to bind its trading nations. 27
2. Harmonization of Trade and Tax Rules
The North American Free Trade Agreement is predicated on the belief
that tariffs and taxation measures create barriers to the cross-border
movement of goods and services between territories.28 Free market eco-
nomic theorists indicate that double taxation, under taxation and the dis-
harmonious application of transactional tax rules create problematic
distortions in international trade and commerce. 29 The Free Trade
Agreement followed upon negotiations that took place under the aus-
pices of the now-defunct General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. 30
Like its European counterpart, NAFTA strove to create an integrated
and comprehensive trading bloc through the adoption of uniform rules
and practices. 31
tries). The redistribution of wealth is an implicit feature of most income tax sys-
tems in existence today. The progressive rate structure based on the ability-to-pay
concept is generally designed to promote the welfare of a country's nationals by
utilizing the tax revenues for social transfers
26. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WLLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 836 (12th ed. 1985)
(making the argument that double taxation inhibits international division of labor,
slows international economic growth and undermines the policies of trade treaties
such as GATT). See also generally, United States International Trade Commis-
sion, POTENTIAL IMPACr ON THE U.S. AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES OF THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Jan. 1993).
27. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2103, para.1 provides that: "Except as set out in this
Article, nothing in this Agreement shall apply to taxation measures." In recogni-
tion of the importance of national tax sovereignty, NAFTA defers determinations
of the appropriateness of various tax measures to the domestic tax laws of its mem-
ber countries. See Cockfield, supra note 4.
28. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1.02 (Objectives).
29. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 26, at 836 (making the argument that
double taxation inhibits international division of labor, slows international eco-
nomic growth and undermines the policies of trade treaties such as GAIT). See
also generally UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, POTENTIAL
IMPACr ON THE U.S. AND SELECrED INDUSTRIES OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT (Jan. 1993).
30. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1950)
[hereinafter GATT].
31. Unlike GATT and other trade agreements, NAFTA sought to mandate coopera-
tion to protect the environment and workers' rights by providing sanctions for in-
effective enforcement of labor and environmental commitments. NAFTA strives
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NAFrA's support for the harmonization of trade and tariff rules
among its signatories does not expressly extend to taxation measures.
The Free Trade Agreement recognizes that the national sovereignty con-
cerns of Member States may from time to time override the liberalized
trade regime set out in NAFTA.32 Basically, the Free Trade Agreement
currently permits its rules and principles to be trumped by bilateral in-
come tax treaties and other domestic tax measures.33 There is legitimate
concern that in the absence of formal harmonization of the tax systems of
the Member States, tax competition for cross-border investment flows
will adversely affect the NAFTA countries.3 Furthermore, the Free
Trade Agreement prescribes that reference to the bilateral tax treaties of
the member countries is required to determine the application of appro-
priate income tax rules.35 By making express reference to the preemi-
nence of the bilateral tax conventions of NAFTA's member countries, the
Free Trade Agreement avoids the task of establishing tax rules. So al-
though NAFTA fundamentally changed the nature of trade and invest-
ment throughout the continent, the agreement did not establish new rules
or mechanisms for taxing cross-border activities.
The absence of tax congruity within NAFTA was exacerbated by the
arrival of technological innovations that widened the differential applica-
tion of tax rules to continental trade flows. The growth of electronic com-
merce blurred the use of traditional source rules resulting in lack of
harmonization in the tax and trade treatment of Internet transactions as
opposed to conventional business transactions. Since source of income
rules constitute a primary determinant of which country is entitled to tax
the income arising from a particular cross-border activity, the source of
income rules of the NAFTA countries must be consistent if the goal of
economic neutrality is to be fully achieved.36 The lack of harmonization
of treatment between e-commerce and conventional business activities
opens the door to a series of additional problems. The application of
to be more than a free trade agreement, but stays away from the harmonization of
socio-political norms proposed by the European Union.
32. See Cockfield, supra note 4, at 49-58 (for an explanation of why NAFTA negotia-
tors opted to cede tax integration in order to accommodate the sovereignty con-
cerns of the NAFIA Member States).
33. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2103, para. 2. For instance, Clause 2104(4)(c) of
NAFTA declares that nothing in the Agreement shall apply any most-favored-
nation obligation with respect to an advantage accorded by a party pursuant to a
tax convention.
34. Cockfield, supra note 4, at 43-44.
35. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2103, para. 2 provides: "Nothing in this Agreement
shall affect the rights and obligations of any Party under any tax convention. In
the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and any such convention,
that convention shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency."
36. Michael S. Schadewald & Tracy A. Kaye, Source of Income Rules and Treaty Relief
From Double Taxation Within the NAFTA Trading Bloc, 61 LA. L. REV. 353, 355
(2001) (wherein it is explained that as the level of trade and investment among
signatories to NAF'A continues to grow, the NAFTA countries will experience
greater pressure to harmonize their respective tax systems and particularly their
source of income rules).
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separate or different tax rules to e-commerce transactions could lead to
the creation of artificial biases in the marketplace. Disharmony in the tax
treatment prescribed by the Member States will hinder the economic effi-
ciencies sought by the Free Trade Agreement. 37
It is difficult to justify the dichotomous treatment of tax and tariff mea-
sures within the Free Trade Agreement. NAFTA represented a multilat-
eral effort by the largest nations of North America to reduce customs,
duties, and tariffs on a wide array of imported goods and to harmonize
the excise tax laws and trade practices of its member countries. One of
the principal objectives of NAFTA continues to be the promotion of eco-
nomic neutrality through the elimination of barriers to cross-border trade
of goods and services. 38 Custom duties, tariffs, and excise taxes represent
trade barriers in the form of indirect taxation. Indirect taxes, such as
sales and value added taxes, and direct taxation in the form of personal
and corporate income taxes also affect transaction pricing, but NAFTA
does not compel the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United
States to harmonize even the most basic application of rules for these
types of taxes. 39
3. National Treatment, Most-Favored Nation Treatment and Taxation in
NAFTA
The trade principle of National Treatment is a fundamental component
of NAFTA.40 Basically, each party to the Free Trade Agreement must
accord to nationals of another party treatment no less favorable than it
accords, in like circumstances, to its own nationals. Where the National
Treatment principle is applied to tax measures, it would prevent a country
from providing tax incentives to its own nationals, unless it also provides
similar tax benefits to the nationals of the other NAFTA countries. By
extrapolation, the National Treatment principle restricts the imposition of
any new or additional sales, use, or other consumption taxes on products
or services provided by individuals or businesses of a NAFTA Member
State, unless such additional tax measures are extended to domestic indi-
viduals or enterprises.
The concept of Most-Favored Nation Treatment in NAFTA requires
each of the Member States to treat nationals of another party no less
favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to nationals of any
other party or of a non-party. The Most-Favored Nation Treatment prin-
37. See Joel Slemrod, Free-Trade Taxation and Protectionist Taxation, 2 INT'L TAX &
PuB. FiN. 471, 472-480 (1995) (for a discussion of how lack of uniformity in inter-
national tax policies undermines the proper functioning of regional trading blocs).
38. Schadewald & Kaye, supra note 40, at 355.
39. Indirect taxes (also referred to as consumption taxes) represent an increasingly
popular mode of taxation for North American governments. Canada and Mexico
collect a significant portion of revenues from a national tax on goods and services.
The United States, which does not levy a national-level sales or value-added tax,
collects almost 45% or over $700 billion of all tax revenues from state and local
taxes.
40. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2103, para. 2; see also Monroy, supra note 7, at 741.
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ciple has become not only a mainstay of international trade arrange-
ments, it is being increasingly incorporated into international tax treaties
that complement regional trading blocs. When extended to tax measures
and treaty provisions adopted by Canada, Mexico, or the United States,
the principle of Most-Favored Nation Treatment would require these
Member States to provide reciprocal tax breaks to the other Member
States any time a tax break is accorded to one of the NAIFTA parties or to
a country that is not a party to the Free Trade Agreement.
The basic NAFTA principles of National Treatment and Most-Favored
Nation Treatment do not, for the most part, apply to the domestic tax
measures of the Member States.41 The prima facie exclusion of national
tax rules from the Free Trade Agreement has important implications.
Even though the objectives of NAFTA strive to create a framework of
equality in the sense that government measures purport to treat investors,
service providers and other parties engaged in cross-border trade in ac-
cordance with the principles of National Treatment and Most-Favored
Nation Treatment, tax measures are basically not governed by the same
standards.4 2
B. DEVELOPMENT OF TAX AND TRADE POLICIES OF
NAFTA PARTIES
The previous section described how the framework established by
NAFTA over a decade ago basically shifted the determination and nego-
tiation of international tax measures from a multilateral trade forum to a
bilateral tax agreement between two member countries. In so doing, the
Free Trade Agreement attributed considerable importance to the particu-
lar national tax policies of each Member State. However, the absence of
tax integration in NAFTA opened the door to the possibility of incongru-
ent tax measures undermining the efficacy of the liberalized trade rules
promoted throughout the Free Trade Agreement. The following section
provides some insights into understanding how NAFTA allowed the po-
tentially huge impediment of divergent tax practices to survive the conti-
nental movement towards an integrated and comprehensive free trade
regime.
1. Prelude to NAFTA
The decades following World War II saw tremendous expansion in
world trade. Ongoing multilateral efforts, such as GATT, encouraged na-
tions to remove impediments to international economic exchanges. As
free trade movements in Europe and Asia intensified, Canada and the
United States reciprocated with their own liberalized trade initiative in
41. Art. 2103, para. 1 of NAFTA establishes: "Except as set out in this Article, noth-
ing in this Agreement shall apply to taxation measures."
42. Monroy, supra note 7, at 741.
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1988.43 Mexico's enthusiastic conversion to the cause of economic liber-
alism in the late 1980s presented an opportunity for the broadening of the
North American trading bloc beyond Canada and the United States of
America.
Formal negotiations toward NAFTA began in February 1988, under the
auspices of the U.S.-Mexico Framework Agreement. Then U.S. Presi-
dent George Bush and Mexican President Salinas issued a formal state-
ment in June 1990 committing their governments to the negotiation of
freer trade between their respective countries. Following this announce-
ment, Canada sought to join in the trade discussions between Mexico and
the United States. By February 1991, American, Mexican, and Canadian
officials had cleared the way for formal negotiations on a trilateral basis
with a view to crafting a broad multilateral free trade agreement. After
fourteen months of apparently intense negotiations, the text of NAFTA
was initialed in Washington, D.C. on August 12, 1992. On September 18,
1992, then U.S. President Bush notified Congress of his intention to sign
NAFTA under the so-called "fast-track" procedures, thereby giving Con-
gress ninety days to review and deliberate the Free Trade Agreement.
The formal signing of NAFTA by the leaders of Canada, Mexico, and the
United States took place on December 17, 1992. The Agreement was
subsequently ratified at different times by the U.S. Senate, the House of
Representatives of the United States, the Senate of Mexico, and the
House of Commons and Senate of Canada. NAFTA came into force on
January 1, 1994.
NAFTA signified a bold attempt to create an integrated North Ameri-
can economy without barriers or distortions to trade in goods or services.
More so than any other trade agreement in place at that time, NAFTA
combined characteristics of both a trade and an investment agreement
into a single instrument. The main purpose of NAFTA was to extend the
reductions in trade barriers, customs and tariffs contained in the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement to Mexico. NAFTA, though, went beyond
custom and tariff reductions by effectively integrating an investment and
services agreement into a conventional trade agreement for the first
time.44
Mexico's inclusion in NAFTA coincided with the proliferation of trade
43. The 1988 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement represented the first major step to-
wards the formation of a regional trade bloc within North America.
44. NAFTA has been referred to as "the most comprehensive package of services
trade and investment liberalization achieved in an intergovernmental trade agree-
ment to date." Pierre Sauve, Regional versus Multilateral Approaches to Services
and Investment Liberalization: Anything to Worry About? See also Serge Devos,
The Multilateral Rules and the New Dimension of Regional Integration: Weak-
nesses, Need and Scope for More Disciplines, in REGIONALISM AND MULTILATER-
ALISM AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND. CONVERGENCES, DIVERGENCES AND
INTERACTION 728 (Paul Demaret et al. eds., Brussels, European Inter-Univ. Press,
1997), at 442.
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liberalization agreements throughout Latin America.45 The proposal to
establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas was announced shortly after
NAFTA was concluded. 46 It would be imprecise, though, to refer to the
FIAA discussions as an extension of NAFTA because of the difference in
the scope of the trade agreements. 47 NAFTA , will undoubtedly influ-
ence and inspire the future of trade integration in the Americas in that
NAFTA serves as the inevitable point of reference for the Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas.48 However, even the most optimistic ob-
servers believe that it would be exponentially more difficult to apply the
NAFIA standards for harmonization of trade in goods, services and in-
vestments in a manner that would be mutually advantageous to all FTAA
parties.49
2. United States Tax and Trade Policies
The United States was party to several tax arrangements in the early
1900s, but it did not enter into its first double taxation treaty until 1932.50
The 1942 tax convention between Canada and the United States was the
first U.S. treaty to apply to investment income and to prescribe mecha-
nisms for administrative cooperation.51 During the ensuing three de-
cades, the U.S. government was able to ratify only a handful of new
treaties, primarily with other developed countries. In 1976, the United
States introduced a model bilateral tax convention that would represent
the starting point for all of its international tax treaty negotiations. 52 The
U.S. Model has been modified several times since its initial presentation
45. The Latin American free trade movement that contributed to the conclusion of
NAFTA also led to the ratification of numerous multilateral regional integration
agreements; at least fifteen bilateral integration agreements; and a huge number of
bilateral investment agreements between Latin American countries, most of which
were signed after 1990. See ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INVEsTMENT
AGREEMENTS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: A COMPENDIUM, available at http://
www.sice.oas.org/bitse.stm..
46. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
47. See Sidney Weintraub, The Meaning of NAFTA and its Implications for the FTAA,
6 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 303, 304 (2000) (wherein it is noted that NAFTA
involves much stricter obligations of its three countries than FFAA would expect
of its more numerous members).
48. FTAA negotiators are using NAFTA as the model for the prospective free trade
agreement for the region with modifications designed to integrate regional con-
cerns. See Lopez-Ayllon, supra note 11, at 255-56.
49. NAFA is more comprehensive in both coverage and disciplines than the other
trade and investment agreements concluded by Latin American countries. See
Weintraub, supra note 46, at 303-04.
50. Convention and Protocol Between The United States and France Concerning
Double Taxation, Apr. 27, 1932, U.S.-Fr., 49 Stat. 3145.
51. For comments regarding early U.S. tax treaty policy, see H. David Rosenbloom &
Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy: An Overview, 19 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT' L. 359, 374 (1981).
52. THE DRAFT UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX TREATY was issued by Press
Release on May 18, 1976; the official text was released a year later (May 17, 1977)
and is reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 10,515, para. 201 [hereinafter 1977 U.S.
Model]. In addition to being a policy statement, the 1977 U.S. Model is suppos-
edly the starting point for the U.S. Treasury in its treaty negotiations.
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with the latest material revision occurring in 1996.53 As the U.S. Model is
designed primarily for use with other industrialized countries, the model
convention did not facilitate the conclusion of treaties with developing
countries.54 The United States does not have a comparable model that it
could refer to when negotiating a tax treaty with a developing country.
a. Tax Sparing
The issue of "tax sparing" involves an extension of the concept of im-
port neutrality. Tax sparing provisions basically allow the tax benefits
offered by a source country to accrue to the taxpayer rather than to the
treasury of the residence country. In an attempt to attract foreign invest-
ment many developing countries offer special tax holidays or other incen-
tives. Since citizens and residents of the United States are taxed on their
worldwide income, most tax incentives would be ineffective unless the
U.S. Treasury either exempted the foreign income or provided a compen-
satory credit. The slow progress of U.S. tax treaty negotiations with de-
veloping countries, in comparison to Canada and various European
nations has been attributed primarily to the refusal of the United States
government to accept the principle of tax sparing. 55
U.S. government policy on the issue of tax sparing has been plagued by
differences in opinion between the country's executive and legislative
branches dating as far back as the late 1950s. 56 The executive branch,
which seems inclined towards improving foreign relations and prospects
for international trade, accepted tax sparing provisions in several treaties,
but it was rebuffed on every occasion by the legislative branch for reve-
53. See UNrrED STATES MODEL INCOME TAx CONVENTION of September 20, 1996, in
INTERNATIONAL TAX TREATIES OF ALL NATIONS 481 (Diamond & Diamond eds.,
1996) [hereinafter 1996 U.S. Model].
54. The U.S. Model treaty is renowned for its emphasis on taxation of multinational
income by the taxpayer's residence country. Most developing countries are capi-
tal-importers and, accordingly, they tend to be opposed to residence country taxa-
tion and favour source country taxation. This tension is highlighted by the U.S.
Model treatment of interest, royalties and dividends, which provides for exclusive
residence country taxation of interest and royalties received by U.S. persons from
foreign sources through the elimination of any withholding tax on such payments,
and stipulates a low withholding tax rate for dividends thereby increasing taxation
of dividends by the residence country. 1996 U.S. Model, supra note 53, arts. 10-12.
55. See Howard M. Liebman, A Formula for Tax-Sparing Credits in U.S. Tax Treaties
with Developing Countries, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 296, 302 (1978).
56. The Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to Income
Between Pakistan and the United States, reprinted in 4 Tax Treaties (CCH) 38,501
(signed July 1, 1957), was indicative of the considerable difficulties encountered by
U.S. tax authorities in the early days of treaty negotiations with developing coun-
tries. The Eisenhower administration concluded a treaty with Pakistan in 1957
that contained a tax sparing provision in favor of Pakistan. The Senate approved
the Convention, but subject to a reservation with respect to the tax sparing provi-
sion. S. Exec. Rep. No.1, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 3 (1958). During the Senate ratifica-
tion of the Pakistan treaty, the Foreign Relations Committee expressed hostility to
the concept of tax sparing and indicated that the treaty should not receive the
requisite support if the tax sparing provision remained. Pakistan unilaterally re-
pealed its tax incentive legislation thereby making the provision moot. Rosen-
bloom & Langbein, supra note 51, at 379-80.
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nue and tax policy reasons.57 Thus, even though Canada and numerous
other developed countries have implemented tax-sparing credits in tax
treaties with developing countries in pursuance of international equity
principles, the United States steadfastly remains committed to its current
policy of resisting tax-sparing concessions. 58
b. Tax Treaties as an Adjunct to Free Trade Agreements
Notwithstanding its opposition to the concept of tax sparing, the
United States has been able to recently expand its tax treaty network to
include several important developing countries. 59 Many of these treaties
were concluded in the past ten years giving credence to the claim that the
U.S. Treasury Department shifted its interests in the early 1990s towards
concluding income tax treaties with emerging economies for a mixture of
political and economic reasons.6° During this time the United States
Treasury targeted Latin America as a high priority for future tax treaty
57. Over the twenty-year period following the U.S.-Pakistan treaty flop of 1958, seven
other developing countries also signed a bilateral tax agreement with the United
States only to have the Senate reject the treaty, or so alter the agreement as to
make the arrangement unacceptable to the treaty partner. The Kennedy and
Johnson administrations abandoned the tax sparing principle, but agreed to extend
to developing countries a credit similar to the statutory investment tax credit that
was enacted for American taxpayers in 1962. However, this approach was eventu-
ally deemed unacceptable by the Foreign Relations Committee. Rosenbloom &
Langbein, supra note 51, at 382-87.
58. See Claudia MacLachlan, Trade Spike Spurs Tax Treaty Talks, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 2,
1996, at Al, A17 (reporting that "the United States is not about to relent on its
opposition to Brazil's negotiation demand for 'tax sparing.'"); see also Richard
Mitchell, United States-Brazil Bilateral Income Tax Treaty Negotiations, 21 HAS-
TINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 209, 230-231 (1997) (noting that U.S. opposition to
tax sparing has gone beyond ideological concerns and that the U.S. position is now
entrenched against tax sparing for practical purposes): "[I]n reality it is unlikely
that the United States will ever relent. Granting tax sparing to Brazil will set an
undesired precedent for future negotiations with other developing countries;
moreover, other treaties already in effect promise to grant tax sparing in the event
that any other country should get tax sparing in a U.S. tax treaty."
59. The United States now has bilateral tax conventions with the following underde-
veloped countries: Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Khazakstan, Ukraine, Thailand,
and Russia.
60. The United States has demonstrated a greater willingness to deviate from the U.S.
Model to address the particular concerns of the developing country, provided the
treaty partner offers potential trade and investment opportunities to U.S. nation-
als. See TAx EXECuTIVES INSTrrUTE, COMMENTS ON U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX
TREATY, 45 THE TAX ExEcu-rvE 66, 67 (1993); and Paul D. Reese, United States
Tax Treaty Policy Toward Developing Countries: The China Example, 35 UCLA L.
REV. 369, 373 (1987) (where political and strategic factors are presented as major
influences in the negotiation of the 1986 U.S.-China Convention). U.S. treaty pol-
icy as embodied by its tax conventions with the two most populous countries in the
world can be reviewed in: Convention Between the United States of America and
the Government of the Peoples Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH), 2137; and
Convention Between the United States of America and the Government of the
Republic of India for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH), 4203.5.
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negotiations as an adjunct to F'AA negotiations.61 In 2000, the United
States launched a major initiative to bolster trade and strengthen rela-
tions with Carribbean and developing nations in Africa.62
The U.S.-Mexico Convention represented a theoretical change in the
direction of U.S. trade and tax policy. By conceding to Mexico relatively
higher levels of source-based taxation, the United States moved towards
using international tax policies as a mechanism to assist U.S. businesses to
compete in a liberalized trade environment. The U.S. Treasury and For-
eign Trade Departments have indicated that the 1992 U.S.-Mexico Con-
vention provides the best example of U.S. tax treaty policy as a conjunct
to its free trade negotiations.63 The United States now appears prepared
to extend the tax and trade benefits enjoyed by Mexico to other countries
in the Americas. It is interesting to note that current U.S. trade policy is
focused on the potential impact of trade and treaty rules on the future of
electronic commerce. 64 However, the United States has not expressed
any clear indication that it seeks to integrate tax rules into NAFTA or the
FTAA to govern global commerce.
3. Canada's Willingness to Accommodate
Canada has developed an extensive network of bilateral tax treaties.65
Canada's first comprehensive double taxation treaty was concluded in
1942 with the United States.66 The current Canada-U.S. Convention gov-
erns more trade and investment income than any other bilateral tax
61. Joseph H. Guttentag, An Overview of International Tax Issues, 50 U. Mtil L.
REv. 445, 450 (1996).
62. On May 18, 2000, the United States enacted the TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AcT
OF 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251 (2000) (a legislative package that con-
tained the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and the U.S.-Caribbean Basin
Trade Partnership Act).
63. See Mitchell, supra note 58, at 239 (where it is claimed that treaties largely mirror-
ing the U.S.-Mexico tax treaty will form the basis of a large, free trade agreement
for the region).
64. U.S. trade policy is committed to using the FTAA to'deepen "our region's under-
standing of the implications and benefits of electronic commerce for our socie-
ties ... In accordance with the President's Global Electronic Commerce initiative,
the Administration seeks to preserve electronic transmissions over the Internet as
duty-free... We also have begun a longer-term work program, whose goals in-
clude ensuring that our trading partners avoid measures that unduly restrict devel-
opment of electronic commerce; ensuring that WTO rules do not discriminate
against new technologies and methods of trade... [and] take maximum advantage
of electronic commerce." Barshefsky, supra note 17.
65. Canada is currently a party to over eighty bilateral tax conventions. See Canada-
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Web site for a list of signed
treaties and to determine the status of treaties under negotiation, http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/menu-en.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2003).
66. Canada's first international taxation treaty, signed in 1928, was also with the
United States of America, but it applied only to the taxation of shipping profits.
Canada subsequently entered into several tax conventions with other trading part-
ners; however, all of these agreements were also restricted to the taxation of multi-
jurisdictional shipping and transportation income.
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treaty in the world.67 Canada's status as a capital-importer vis-A-vis the
United States, and a capital-exporter to most other countries in the
world, has influenced the development of Canada's tax treaties.68 Ca-
nada's success in concluding treaties with developing countries could be
attributed to the government's willingness to recognize and accommodate
the interests of developing countries in its tax treaty negotiations. For
instance, one popular accommodation device that is found in most of Ca-
nada's tax treaties with developing countries is the tax sparing
provision. 69
Canada has, in many of its treaty conventions, adopted a variation of
the Most-Favored Nation Treatment principle common to trade agree-
ments.70 Theoretically, when negotiating a tax treaty with another devel-
oped country, Canada will generally accord the taxpayers of the
developed country the same treatment that it accords investors and ex-
porters from other developed countries. On the other hand, if Canada is
negotiating a tax treaty with a developing country, Canada will normally
grant and accept the fairest and best deal that the developing country can
afford based on the developing country's treatment of taxpayers from
other developed countries. In other words, Canadian negotiators attempt
to secure for Canadian taxpayers treatment from the developing country
as favourable as the best treatment accorded to investors and exporters
from other developed nations. In 1991, Canada became the first nation
to conclude a comprehensive tax convention with Mexico. 71 Canada's
Most-Favored Nation international tax policy has been a significant factor
in the development of its expansive treaty network.
67. The 1942 Canada-U.S. Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation has
been revised numerous times since its ratification. The 1980 Canada-U.S. Income
Tax Convention, signed at Washington, D.C. on September 26, 1980, amended by a
First Protocol in 1983; amended by a Second Protocol in 1984. Income Tax Con-
vention, Sept. 26, 1980, U.S.-Can., art. 30, 1980 U.S.T. 154 [hereinafter Canada-
U.S. Convention].
68. It is claimed that Canada must always be conscious of how treaty negotiations with
other countries will impact on Canada's ongoing treaty negotiations with its most
important treaty partner, the United States. See Alexander J. Easson, The Evolu-
tion of Canada's Tax Treaty Policy Since the Royal Commission on Taxation, 26
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 495, 510 (1988).
69. See CANADA'S TAX TREATIES 1 (A. McKie ed., 1999) [hereinafter CANADA'S TAX
TREATIES].
70. Canada formulated its tax treaty policy of Most Favoured Nation Treatment in the
early 1970s and apparently the policy has not materially changed since then. Id.
71. Actually, Canada entered into treaty negotiations with Mexico in the early 1970s,
but the two countries were unable to finalize an agreement at that time due to
Mexico's strong adherence to the principle of exclusive taxation of international
income at source. See id. at 667. THE CONVEWNION FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF
DouBLE TAXATION ON INCOME BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED MEXICAN
STATES was signed on April 8, 1991, Can.-Mex. (hereinafter Canada-Mexico Con-
vention). The Canada-Mexico Convention was proclaimed into force on May 11,
1992, with many of its provisions made retroactive to January 1, 1992.
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4. Mexico as the Gateway to the Americas
"Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States. " 72
Mexico's trade relations with the United States have always been a per-
vasive feature of Mexican foreign policy. In the decades following the
end of World War II, Mexico's trade policies focused on reducing eco-
nomic dependence and vulnerability to the United States. 73 For many
years, Mexico and most of Latin America espoused the protectionist pol-
icy of "economic development from within."' 74 The Mexican government
would subsidize the establishment of domestic industries and protect
them against foreign competition. Mexico's closed economy was based
on import substitution, which subjected foreign investors and industries
to stringent restrictions and requirements to employ large amounts of in-
puts produced in Mexico. 75
While Mexico's policy of development from within fostered the growth
of a domestic industrial sector, Mexican production was generally not
competitive in world markets. The collapse and near bankruptcy of Mex-
ico's economy in the early 1980s necessitated dramatic structural changes
in economic policy. Mexico's formal abandonment in 1982 of its long-
standing policy of development from within set the stage for the country
to open its markets to international trade.76 By 1986 Mexico had joined
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATr). Within a few
years after its acceptance of GATT, Mexico had dismantled its tariff re-
gime and enacted tax reforms designed to attract foreign investment to
the country.77 The taxation of international income eventually became a
72. SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, MEuCAN TRADE POLICY AND THE NORTH AMERICAN COM-
MUNrrY, vii (1988).
73. In 1990, the United States was the destination of almost 70% of Mexico's overall
exports and over 80% of Mexico's manufactured goods exports, but due to the
relatively low incomes of its people, Mexico was unable to provide the reciprocal
market to U.S. exports.
74. This policy was initially formulated by the Economic Commission for Latin
America and was based on the premise that the path to development was through
the establishment of a manufacturing base. See J.L. Love, Raul Prebish and the
Origins of the Doctrine of Unequal Exchange, 15 LATIN AM. REs. REV. 45 (1980).
75. Lopez-Ayllon, supra note 11, at 241.
76. The ascendancy of Miguel de la Madrid to the Presidency in 1982 coincided with
Mexico's declaration that international trade represented the new path to industri-
alization and growth. Mexico's trade balance went from deficit in 1981 to surplus
in 1982 and following years. Mexico's increase in exports was largely the result of
greater sales of oil to foreigners, which by 1986 had climbed to almost 78% of total
exports. When the price of oil collapsed in 1986 the Mexican economy was once
again perched on the edge of total collapse. By then Mexico's external debt had
reached epic proportions and the value of its currency plummeted rapidly, which
in turn fuelled annual inflation to three-digit levels. Under President Miguel de la
Madrid's leadership, Mexico was able to reschedule interest payments on its for-
eign debt. The World Bank subsequently extended hundreds of millions of dollars
of loans to Mexico on the condition Mexico lower tariffs and undertake other im-
port liberalization measures.
77. Following the election of Carlos Saunas de Gortari as President in 1988, the Mexi-
can government undertook tax reforms that gradually reduced corporate income
tax rates and the rates of withholding tax payable by non-residents on interest
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primary component of Mexican foreign trade policy.78
Mexico's decision to pursue free trade negotiations with Canada and
the United States required substantial changes in Mexico's tax and legal
systems.79 Mexico and other relatively poor countries persistently re-
fused to enter into bilateral tax agreements with developed countries un-
less provision would be made to ensure reciprocity of revenue claims in
connection with multinational business and investment income. 80 As part
of the NAFTA process, Mexico had to enter into bilateral tax treaties
with each of the other Member States. The Canada-Mexico Convention
that was signed during the NAFTA negotiations constituted the first com-
prehensive tax treaty concluded by Mexico.81 Mexico had historically
supported the principle of assigning exclusive taxation of international
income to the source country.s2 The Canada-Mexico Convention, a hy-
brid of the texts of the OECD Model and the UN Model, represented a
dramatic departure on Mexico's part from its historical territorial taxa-
tion policies.8 3
In 1992, Mexico and the United States concluded a bilateral tax treaty
that, from Mexico's perspective, departed relatively far from the coun-
try's long-standing policy of primary source taxation.84 Mexico's decision
to conclude a free trade agreement with the United States required the
abandonment of any notion of special accommodation within NAFTA or
the associated bilateral tax treaties. Mexico could not, on one hand,
income and royalty payments for technical assistance to levels comparable to those
in Canada and the United States.
78. See L. Rubio, The Rationale for NAFTA: Mexico's New 'Outward-Looking' Strat-
egy, 27 Bus. ECON. 12 (Apr. 1992) (where it is suggested that Mexico's traditional
support of the principle of exclusive taxation at source coupled with its new, lower
income tax rates reduced the incidence of double taxation while permitting the
Mexican treasury to receive the revenue benefits of increased foreign investment).
79. "It should be noted that the cost Mexico had to pay to prepare for and adapt to the
new circumstances, including the negotiation and implementation of NAFTA, was
extremely significant. Without going into details, between 1982 and 1995, most of
Mexico's internal legal system was modified, particularly as regards economic,
trade, and financial issues. Thus, 164 of the 204 federal statutes (except for Federal
District legislation) in force in 1995 were new or substantially modified. In other
words, Mexico had to modify nearly eighty percent of its domestic legal system as
a result of the new orientation of the economic growth model and trade liberaliza-
tion." Lopez-Ayllon, supra note 11, at 243.
80. See Sonia Zapata, The Latin American Approach to the Concept of Permanent Es-
tablishment in Tax Treaties with Developed Countries, 52 BULL. FOR INT'L Fisc.
Doc. 252, 253 (1998).
81. Canada-Mexico Convention, supra note 67.
82. Like many other Latin American countries, Mexico was reluctant to reduce the
level of source country taxation and, therefore, had avoided concluding any tax
treaties prior to NAFTA.
83. It was necessary that Mexico abandon the territorial principle of taxation that it
historically supported because Canada and the United States were not prepared to
abandon their entire treaty network, which would be necessary if Canada and the
United States were to accept the source taxation principles introduced in the 1943
Mexico Model.
84. Tax Convention Between the United States of America and'the United Mexican
States (Sept. 18, 1992) U.S.-Mex., S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-7 (1992), reprinted in 2
Tax Treaties (CCH) 5903 [hereinafter U.S.-Mexico Convention].
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plead with its NAFTA partners for special treatment in bilateral treaty
negotiations because of its status as a developing country and, on the
other hand, demand more or less equal status and participation in the
comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. By signing NAFTA and conclud-
ing bilateral tax conventions with both Canada and the United States,
Mexico was able to establish a system that allowed its people to partici-
pate in the acquiring of wealth created by free trade. 85 In so doing, Mex-
ico was able to assume a leadership role in the Latin American
movement towards trade integration throughout the Americas. 86
III. INTERACTION OF INCOME TAX LAWS
AND NAFTA RULES
A. DOMEsTIc TAX TREATMENT OF MULTINATIONAL INCOME
1. Taxation of Foreign Income of Nationals
The domestic income tax laws of the parties to NAFTA are predicated
on the global taxation of the income of their own nationals. The United
States taxes all U.S. persons on their worldwide incomes. 87 Canada and
Mexico similarly tax the world incomes of their respective resident indi-
viduals, trusts and business entities.88 Resident taxpayers are generally
required to include all income derived from domestic and foreign sources
when calculating taxable income for a given taxation period. Domestic
taxpayers in the United States, Canada, and Mexico are generally subject
to income taxation on a net basis. Residents are required to report in-
come from all sources for the taxation period in question, but the national
treasury permits deductions for the purpose of determining taxable in-
come subject to domestic taxation.
85. See Monroy, supra note 7, at 740.
86. Moreover, Mexico has successfully used material parts of NAFrA as a model in its
trade negotiations with other Latin American countries. See Lopez-Ayllon, supra
note 11, at 254. Buoyed by Mexico's successes, Chile signed a free trade agree-
ment with Canada and Mexico that essentially followed the trade aspects of the
NAFTA model.
87. United States persons are taxed on their global income. INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1986, as amended [hereinafter I.R.C.], § 61 (2002). Citizens, resident in-
dividuals and domestic corporations are among the classes of taxpayers included in
the statutory definition of a "United States person." I.R.C. 7701(a)(30) (2002).
Whether an individual is considered a resident of the United States for tax pur-
poses will generally depend on the person's legal status, personal circumstances,
and whether the resident has a tax home in a foreign country and/or the degree of
the individual's physical presence in the United States. Unlike its NAFTA coun-
terparts, the United States also taxes individuals on the basis of citizenship. See
I.R.C.§ 865 and Treas. Reg. §1.1-1.(c),, as amended..
88. Canada taxes the global income of its resident individuals, trusts and corporations.
INCOME TAX AcT, R.S.C., ch. 1 (1985) (5th Supp.), as amended [hereinafter
I.T.A.], § 2. Mexico also imposes an income tax based on the residence of the
taxpayer with residents subject to tax on a worldwide basis. The Mexican tax sys-
tem is comprised of a number of taxes imposed principally at the federal level;
there are no state or city income taxes in Mexico. See Monroy, supra note 7, at
742, 747 (indicating that Mexico's taxing powers arise from the obligation of citi-
zens to make contributions to satisfy public expenses established in article 31(IV)
of "Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos").
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A corporation is prima facie subject to taxation as a national of the
jurisdiction where the entity was incorporated. 89 While many nations de-
fine a resident corporation, for tax purposes, as a company incorporated
in the state, a significant number of countries have also enacted laws that
purport to deem a corporation to be a resident of the country if the com-
pany's place of central management is located domestically or, more
rarely, if the corporation's principal economic activities are conducted lo-
cally.90 Corporate residence has an intentionally wide scope under the
domestic tax laws of each of Canada, Mexico, and the United States due
to the concerns of national tax authorities regarding the potential for ma-
nipulation of corporate residence rules for tax avoidance purposes. The
malleable nature of global business enterprises, particularly those en-
gaged in e-commerce and other digital activities, are increasingly wreak-
ing havoc with the application of traditional source and residence rules.
For instance, e-commerce enterprises based in the United States have had
to extrapolate from existing legislation, Public Law 86-272, in order to
claim exemption from income taxation in states where the entity does not
have a substantial presence. 91
2. Taxation of Domestic Income of Foreign Nationals
Non-residents are often subject to taxation in the country where they
earn income. 92 Investment income has its source in the jurisdiction where
the payer of the interest, royalty or dividend is situated. Business income
is generally taxed on the basis of the connection between the commercial
enterprise and the jurisdiction where the income is derived. Foreign busi-
nesses are subject to the national tax laws of all nations where they com-
plete sales, unless the foreign national can demonstrate that it did not
meet the minimum nexus for taxation in the source country.
The United States' threshold for determining whether the business
profits of a non-resident fall within the country's tax jurisdiction involves
an analysis of the nature of the activities of the foreign national. .93 Non-
89. See, e.g., I.R.C., supra note 87, § 7701(a)(4) (which defines a domestic corporation
as an entity that was "created or organized in the United States or under the law of
the United States or of any State").
90. JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN
PERSONS AND FOREIGN INCOME 4.1, at 3 (1996).
91. See generally KARL FRIEDEN, CYBERTAXATION: THE TAXATION OF E-COMMERCE
334-41 (2000). Basically, Public Law 86-272 is a special federal statute that pre-
vents states from imposing income taxes on sellers of physical goods whose only
contact with the state is the solicitation of orders. See Uniform Division of Income
Tax Purposes Act, Pub. L. No. 82-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959). Even though Public
Law 86-272 was enacted by Congress to protect vendors of tangible personal prop-
erty from having to comply with a wide array of state income tax rules, it is ex-
pected that the legislation can be utilized by e-commerce businesses operating in
the United States.
92. For instance, Canada's domestic tax rules apply to any non-resident earning office,
employment or other income within Canada. I.T.A., supra note 88, § 3.
93. Tax authorities in the United States and Canada utilize a similar minimum nexus
standard for determining jurisdiction to tax the multinational business profits of
non-residents. See Forgione, supra note 10, at 734-45. The test for determination
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resident corporations and individuals are subject to income taxation in
the United States on all income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or
business. 94 Generally, in order for a foreign entity to be treated for tax
purposes as being engaged in a U.S. trade or business, the business activi-
ties must be of a regular, continuous, and substantial nature.95 An occa-
sional or isolated sale transaction will not in itself cause a foreign vendor
to be liable for income taxation in the United States. 96 Where a foreign
resident is subject to the tax jurisdiction of the United States on the basis
that it is engaged in a trade or business within the United States, then all
effectively-connected U.S. source income of the non-resident will be
taxed at the same rates and in the same manner as the income of a do-
mestic U.S. taxpayer.97
In Canada, a foreign company that is found to be "carrying on business
in Canada" will be subject to Canadian income tax.98 The determination
of whether the foreign national is carrying on business in Canada will
depend on the ordinary meaning of the words as applied to the context of
the non-resident's business activities in Canada. Canada's tax rules could
apply to any activity in which a person solicits orders or offers anything
of the appropriate nexus for Mexican income taxation is not always clear. Mexican
tax law utilizes the concept of permanent establishment in its domestic legislation,
but provides for a number of situations where a non-resident without a permanent
establishment will nonetheless be subject to income taxation in Mexico based on a
wide array of deemed sources of income. Title V of Ley Del Impuesto Sobre La
Renta covers most common types of business and non-business related income.
Monroy, supra note 7, at 747.
94. The tax liability of non-resident individuals is determined under Internal Revenue
Code, §§ 871 to 877, while the U.S. tax liability for foreign corporations is set out
in Internal Revenue Code, §§ 881 to 884. I.R.C., supra note 87, §§ 871-77, 881-84.
95. The Internal Revenue Code does not contain a helpful definition of what would
constitute a trade or business. Whether a business is deemed to be engaged in a
trade or business in the U.S. will depend on the facts of each case. The determina-
tion of what activities would be sufficient to constitute a U.S. trade or business has
been developed by various court decisions and revenue rulings over the years. The
principle of regular, substantive and continuous activity as creating a nexus for
income taxation is derived from the leading case of Spermacet Whaling & Ship-
ping Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 618, 634 (1958). Substantial U.S. sales by a
nonresident may not in itself create a U.S. tax liability. See Commissioner v.
Piedras Negras Broadcasting Co., 127 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1942).
96. OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, SELECrED TA
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, 7.2.3.1. (1996), avail-
able at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/internet.pdf (where the
U.S. Treasury declares: "[T]o the extent that the activities of a person engaged in
electronic commerce are equivalent to the mere solicitation of orders from U.S.
customers, without any other U.S. activity, it may not be appropriate to treat such
activities as a U.S. trade or business.").
97. U.S. tax law provides that where income is "effectively connected" with a trade or
business in the United States, such income will be subject to U.S. federal income
tax. See I.R.C., supra note 87, §§ 864(b)-(c), 882(a)(1) (which applies to foreign
corporations, allows the profits of the foreign enterprise that are attributed to the
United States to be calculated like those of a U.S. resident, that is, subject to U.S.
taxation on a net basis).
98. A non-resident enterprise will be subject to income taxation in Canada if it is de-
termined that the foreign entity is carrying on business within Canada. I.T.A.,
§§ 2(3)(b), 253(b).
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for sale in Canada through an agent or servant, whether the contract or
transaction is completed inside or outside Canada. 99
The nexus for income taxation established under the domestic tax laws
of the United States and Canada is materially altered by the provisions
found in the applicable tax treaties. It is possible under most bilateral tax
conventions for a foreign business, particularly an e-commerce enter-
prise, to conclude regular, continuous and substantial sales in a NAFTA
country without being subject to taxation in that source country. Most
significantly, the treatment accorded to foreign businesses under bilateral
tax treaties bypasses the criteria used to determine minimum business
contact under the national tax rules of each of the NAFTA Member
States.
3. Unilateral Application of Foreign Tax Credit Rules
Since most nations tax residents on worldwide income and also tax
non-residents on domestic income earned within the country's borders, it
is easy to envision instances of double taxation of the same income.
Double taxation may arise whenever a country asserts jurisdiction to tax
the foreign income of its residents or citizens and the same income has
been subject to tax in the foreign country. Canada, Mexico, and the
United States have adopted rules in their domestic tax regimes that ad-
dress this potentially huge obstacle to international trade.100 The domes-
tic tax rules of each of these countries provide unilateral relief from
double taxation to the residents of the country by granting a tax credit for
foreign taxes paid. 10 1 The foreign tax credit regime generally applies only
to income tax payments made to foreign treasuries.102 Foreign tax credit
rules effectively permit resident taxpayers to offset the amount of foreign
income taxes paid against the amount of domestic income taxes that
99. The meaning of the phrase "carrying on business" has been explored infrequently
by Canadian courts, but it appears clear that the non-resident must engage in activ-
ities beyond a mere invitation to treat or sell. See Sudden Valley Inc. v. The
Queen, [1976] C.T.C. 775 (F.C.A.).
100. Tax laws in the United States and Canada generally allow the taxpayer to claim a
credit for foreign taxes paid on foreign business income with the amount of the
credit calculated on a country-by-country basis up to the amount of domestic tax
that would otherwise be payable on the foreign source income. I.R.C., §§ 901-908.
Canada's foreign tax credit rules are contained in I.T.A., supra note 86, §§ 90-95,
126. In Mexico, the foreign tax credit provisions were extensively revised in 1998
and now allow for direct and indirect credits, establish a ten-year carry forward
term and set forth useful guidelines to avoid double taxation due to overlapping
residence or citizenship rules established by Ley Del Impuesto Sobre La Renta.
Monroy, supra note 7, at 747.
101. Some countries use an exemption system as an alternative to the tax credit mecha-
nisms popular in North America. Under an exemption system, the foreign source
income earned by the resident taxpayer is basically exempted from the resident's
tax base. The exemption or territorial system of providing relief from double taxa-
tion may be found in limited circumstances in Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. tax
laws, such as in connection with exempt dividends of certain foreign affiliates.
102. The relief from double taxation provided by the foreign tax credit rules does not
usually extend to sales, use, goods and services, social security, value-added and
other non-income taxes.
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would otherwise be subject to basket or source limitations. 10 3 Domestic
foreign tax credit rules are structured so that taxes paid to foreign gov-
ernments cannot be applied to offset the amount of taxes due to the tax-
payer's country of residence on domestic source income.
B. TAXATION OF INCOME UNDER BILATERAL TAX TREATIES
1. Significance of Tax Conventions Generally
A nation's tax treatment of the multinational income of its residents is
modified by the rules and principles established by the country's tax trea-
ties. Bilateral tax conventions present a mechanism for two countries to
agree upon ways of eliminating or reducing double taxation of multina-
tional income, promoting information exchanges between tax authorities
and ameliorating any discriminatory tax treatment of foreign businesses.
The elimination of double taxation for individuals and enterprises having
income-earning operations in more than one country is the most fre-
quently cited rationale for entering into an international tax treaty. 10 4 In
fact, elimination of double taxation is no longer the primary objective of
modern tax treaties because the domestic tax laws of most countries in-
corporate relieving provisions to deal with the potential problem of
double taxation. 0 5
It is a reality of international taxation that treaty partners are moti-
vated more by their own fiscal interests than concern over the plight of
the taxpayer. 0 6 Taxation treaties usually assign one country the primary
103. In Canada, foreign income tax payments can be credited against Canadian income
taxes payable, but the foreign tax credit amount is effectively limited to the
amount of Canadian tax otherwise payable on each source of foreign source in-
come. U.S. tax law uses a basket system for different sources of foreign income.
Under the basket system, U.S. resident taxpayers claiming a foreign tax credit
must allocate their foreign source income according to statutory categories of in-
come that are defined by specific criteria. Unused credits for foreign taxes paid
may typically be carried forward to future years; income that does not fall within
any of the defined categories falls into a general limitation basket. I.R.C.,
§ 904(d)(1)(I). Congress apparently designed the basket system in order to stop
domestic taxpayer abuse of the foreign tax credit rules. See CHARLES H. GUSTAF-
SON & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSAC-
TIoNs 8067 (4th ed. 1995).
104. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination Against International Com-
merce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131 (2001) (where it is noted that the avoidance of double
taxation was historically cited as the rationale for entering into tax conventions,
but suggesting that bilateral tax treaties may actually impose barriers to interna-
tional commerce).
105. Other plausible rationales for entering into bilateral tax treaties are the prevention
of tax avoidance and evasion; to reduce impediments to trade and investment; pro-
vision of assurances of stability for foreign trade and investment; and promotion of
fiscal incentives for private investment in developing countries. See U.N. DEPART-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, U.N. MODEL DOUBLE
TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1
(1980) [hereinafter U.N. MODEL].
106. See Forgione, supra note 10, at 752-53 (where I argue in greater detail that due to
countries having unilaterally taken steps to protect their residents from double
taxation of foreign source income, the primary motivating force for the conclusion
of new tax treaties is often the fiscal demands of taxing nations.).
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or exclusive right to tax certain types of income. Although tax treaties do
not levy any new taxes, they provide rules that accommodate competing
tax claims. Since national tax laws effectively resolve many instances of
international double taxation, the motivating force behind entering into a
tax treaty in the twenty-first century appears to focus on the division of
tax claims. Where a bilateral tax treaty does not exist, a country will gen-
erally have the primary and unrestricted right to impose tax on income
derived from sources within the country. The country in which the tax-
payer is resident will typically provide relief from double taxation either
through the credit or exemption method. 10 7
The existence of a tax treaty or agreement between two countries sig-
nificantly changes the status quo. Treaty rules provide tie-breakers in in-
stances where overlapping substantive tax claims exist. One of the
contracting states is bound to withdraw all or part of its tax claim, usually
by limiting the application of its domestic source rules. Bilateral tax trea-
ties establish an independent mechanism for allocating taxing jurisdiction
and, accordingly, a means of dividing aggregate available tax revenues
between two contracting states. Treaty rules that allocate tax jurisdiction
over multinational income are likely to have little or no impact on net
revenue flows between nations with relatively similar trading power.
However, fiscal imbalances arise when bilateral treaties developed for
countries with relatively equal trading strength are applied to situations
involving significant disparities between the contracting nations. When
prevailing tax treaty norms are adapted to unequal economic exchanges,
the taxpayer's country of residence will scoop a greater share of tax reve-
nues compared to the pre-treaty situation. The prevalence of treaty rules
that, in effect, penalize capital-importing and other economically disad-
vantaged countries has been the most significant obstacle to the conclu-
sion of tax treaties between developed and developing countries.' 0 8
Bilateral tax treaties have anomalous practical implications. Since
many of the world's large multinational enterprises have their head office
or base in an industrialized country, the current network of bilateral tax
treaties distorts the allocation of income tax revenues in favor of capital-
exporting industrialized countries. Tax treaty rules basically require capi-
tal-importing nations (usually developing countries) to forego substantial
amounts of revenue in favor of capital-exporting nations (typically devel-
107. The United States, Canada, and Mexico rely primarily on foreign tax credit rules
for relief from double taxation while other nations provide relief by exempting the
foreign source income of their own residents from domestic tax. The widespread
use of such unilateral tax-relieving provisions effectively reduces the prospect of
double taxation in the absence of a tax treaty. Double taxation may still arise in
cases where countries have overlapping residence or source jurisdiction rules.
Countries, such as the United States, that purport to tax individuals or corpora-
tions on grounds other than residence (e.g., citizenship) use tax conventions to
address particular concerns about double taxation.
108. See Stanley S. Surrey, United Nations Group of Experts and the Guidelines for Tax
Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, 19 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 11
(1978).
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oped countries), despite the legitimate claim of the source country to
these revenues. The current treaty network, therefore, has the odd effect
of promoting revenue flows from the treasuries of poor countries to the
treasuries of rich nations. To make matters worse, the growth of elec-
tronic commerce further encourages this process of reverse foreign
aid.109 The continued inequitable distribution of tax claims will under-
mine multilateral efforts to promote worldwide acceptance of interna-
tional trade and taxation norms.
In addition to contributing to odd imbalances of tax revenues between
disparate nations, bilateral tax treaties also open the door for complex tax
avoidance schemes and treaty shopping.110 Technological developments
facilitate the maneuvrability of residence to take advantage of treaty
rules. It is now possible for multinational enterprises to carry on business
activities in multiple jurisdictions with numerous offices and without any
clear central place of management. These stateless entities can engage in
substantial amounts of international trade without having to establish a
fixed base in any particular country. Tax authorities are becoming in-
creasingly concerned that mobile commercial entities are being designed
to exploit traditional treaty definitions that place great importance on the
location of a permanent establishment and corporate residence. It has
been argued that efforts to determine the locations and residence of these
global commercial enterprises are "largely an effort to put flesh into fic-
tion, to find economic and political substance in a world occupied by legal
niceties.""'
2. Historical Development of Model Taxation Treaties
The expansion in the number and scope of tax treaties in recent years
can be traced to the increased sophistication and refinement of model
conventions aimed at the prevention of double taxation. The origin of
most model treaties can be traced to a multilateral tax agreement en-
dorsed by the League of Nations in 1928.112 The original model treaty,
really a set of rules that came to be known as the 1920's compromise,
established a balance between the revenue interests of the source and
109. See Forgione, supra note 10, at 759-62 (where it is noted that e-commerce enter-
prises are far less dependent on the presence of a permanent establishment or
tangible fixed base within the market country.)
110. See Allan R. Lanthier, The Concept of Residence, in IFA SPECIAL SEMINAR ON
CANADIAN TAx TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE, 13:1-21 (Brian Arnold & Jac-
ques Sasseville eds., 2001).
111. Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, Taxing International Income:
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L.
REv. 261, 320 (2001).
112. 1928 BIATERAL CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF DoUBLE TAXATION IN
THE SPECIAL MATTER OF DIRECT TAxES. For an historical overview of early in-
ternational tax and treaty developments, see ARVID A. SKAAR, PERMANENT Es-
TABLISHMENT: EROSION OF A TAX TREATY PRINCIPLE 78, 82-85 (1991); see
Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. Interna-
tional Taxation, 46 DuKE L.J. 1021 (1997), at 1041-1108.
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residence countries. 113 The compromise referred to an arrangement that
allowed the source country to tax profits derived from certain business
operations of a foreign enterprise within the country as well as to tax part
of any rents, royalties, interest or dividends paid to a foreign resident. 114
Many nations, especially the emerging countries of Latin America,
were opposed to the 1920s compromise eschewed by the League of Na-
tions almost from its inception."15 In 1943, the Fiscal Committee of the
League of Nations, including representatives from Latin America, the
United States, and Canada, met in Mexico City with the intention of
drafting a tax convention that would address the concerns of developing
countries. Following contested discussion, the Committee adopted a
model tax convention, often referred to as the "Mexico Draft," that
granted the source country considerable jurisdiction to tax income gener-
ated by foreign residents within the host country."16 The Mexico Draft
has been called "the first attempt by the developing countries to write a
model treaty reflecting their particular problems. 1" 7
Industrialized countries were not prepared to accept the possible reve-
nue losses associated with the expanded source country taxation rules set
out in the Mexico Draft. When the Fiscal Committee of the League of
Nations met again in 1946, this time in London, the Committee sought to
obtain the endorsement of the international community to residence tax-
ation on the grounds of administrative convenience and the promotion of
the principle of capital-export neutrality. Accordingly, the League of Na-
tions adopted an alternate model tax convention to the Mexico Draft that
promoted greater limitations on the scope of taxation of foreigners earn-
ing income within the host country." 8
113. The 1920's compromise generally acknowledged the primacy of source taxation
with limitations that would allow the taxpayer's country of residence to some for-
eign source business income and a large portion of passive forms of income, such
as dividends, interest and royalties. The current network of international tax trea-
ties has not, in practice, maintained the conceptual framework of the 1920s com-
promise. See Graetz, supra note 111, at 261-62.
114. Tax literature generally refers to the country where an investor or business tax-
payer has its residence as the "residence country" and the country where the con-
sumer resides or where the income is generated as the "source country."
115. See Zapata, supra note 80, at 253.
116. See Honey L. Goldberg, Conventions for the Elimination of International Double
Taxation: Toward a Developing Country Model, 15 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 833,
852-54 (1983). The 1943 draft treaty entitled "Model Bilateral Convention for the
Prevention of Double Taxation of Income" came to be known as the "Mexico
Draft." The Mexico Draft included provisions that would permit the source coun-
try to tax business profits arising from non-isolated transactions concluded within
the borders of the host country; successor treaties restricted source taxation of
multinational business profits by focusing on the nature of the enterprise structure
(presence of fixed base or permanent establishment) rather than on the nature of
the underlying business transaction (isolated sales or regular activities).
117. Id.
118. FISCAL COMMITEE OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS, THE MODEL BILATERAL CONVEN-
TION FOR THE PREVENTION OF THE DOUBLE TAxATION OF INCOME AND PROP-
ERTY (1946). The text and commentary for both the "Mexico Draft" and the
"London Model" are reprinted in U.N. MODEL, supra note 105.
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In 1963, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), which was an association of the world's most industrial-
ized countries at that time, endorsed a bilateral model treaty that
replicated the emphasis on residence country taxation promoted by the
1946 London Model. 119 Based on the strong endorsement of developed
countries, the OECD Model quickly became the blueprint for numerous
bilateral tax treaties between industrialized countries. Virtually all tax
treaty negotiations in the world today start with the OECD Model.
Under the OECD Model, the source country is expected to drastically
curtail the scope of its jurisdiction to tax international income or to lower
its rates of taxation where jurisdiction is retained. Because the OECD's
purpose is aid its members (developed, industrialized countries) in the
negotiation of bilateral tax treaties, the OECD Model favors the adminis-
trative convenience of taxation by the income recipient's country of
residence.
Most Latin American countries were strongly opposed to the underly-
ing principles of the OECD Model. Some countries proposed a return to
the principles outlined in the Mexico Draft, while other Latin American
jurisdictions argued for exclusive taxation of income in the country of
source. As a way of enhancing the progress and productivity of their
economies, several Latin American countries joined forces and formed
the Latin American Free Trade Association, also referred to as the An-
dean Group. In 1971, the Andean Group presented a tax convention that
emphasized the principle of exclusive taxation at source. 120 The Andean
Group steadfastly supported taxation of multi-jurisdictional income in
the source country. 121 Very few capital exporting nations were prepared
to accept the territorial principle espoused by the Andean Model and,
hence, the Andean Model failed to gain popularity outside of Latin
America.'"
119. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE MODEL
CONVENTION FOR THE AvonANcE OF DOUBLE TAXATION WrTI-I RESPECT TO
TAxEs ON INCOME AND CAPrrAL (1963) [hereinafter OECD MODEL]. The OECD
Model was revised and republished by the OECD in 1977 and again in 1992. The
OECD Model double taxation treaty of 1963 and the revised model tax conven-
tions of 1977 and 1992 form the basis of most modem bilateral taxation treaties.
120. THE MODEL CONVENTION FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION BETWEEN
MEMBER COUNTRIES AND OTHER COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE SUBREGION [herein-
after Andean Model] is contained in the COMMISSION OF CARTAGENA AGREE-
MENT, dated November 16, 1971, and is translated in E. Piedrabuena, The Model
Convention to Avoid Double Income Taxation in the Andean Pact, in FISCAL HAR-
MONIZATION IN THE ANDEAN CoUNTRIms 36, Annex N (Atchabahian et al., eds.,
1975) [hereinafter FIsCAL HARMONIZATION].
121. Regardless of nationality or domicile of the taxpayer, income of any nature ob-
tained shall be taxed only in the Contracting State in which the source of such
income production exists, except for those cases mentioned in this Convention.
Andean Model, supra note 120, art. 4.
122. See generally James S. Hausman, The Andean Pact Model Convention as viewed by
the Capital Exporting Nations, in FIsCAL HARMONIZATION, supra note 120, at 59-
64.
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Developing countries outside of Latin America asked the United Na-
tions (UN) to develop a model bilateral tax convention that would not be
plagued by the various restrictions on source country taxation set out in
the OECD Model. 123 The UN model tax convention was introduced in
1980 in order to establish a framework for the negotiation of bilateral tax
treaties between developed and developing countries. Due to the imbal-
ance of international trade flows between rich and poor nations, develop-
ing countries claimed that the limitations on income taxation in the
source country adversely affected capital-importing nations, many of
which are developing countries. 124 The UN Model attempts to accommo-
date the interests of developing countries by expanding the scope of
source country taxation relative to the OECD Model and by endorsing,
in part, the principle of tax sparing. 2 5 However, since the UN group of
experts used the OECD Model as its primary reference point in drafting
the UN Model, many people believe that the final text of the UN Model
was overly influenced by the OECD Model. 26 Tax authorities from
many developing countries remain opposed to the limitations on source
taxation set out in both the OECD Model and the UN Model. 2 7
123. In addition to the inequity of revenue losses, the restrictions on source taxation set
out in the OECD Model were perceived by many developing countries as unac-
ceptable limitations on their tax sovereignty. See U.N. DEPARTMENT OF Eco-
NOMIC & SocIAL AFFAIRS, TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND
DEVELOPING CouNTRiEs: FIRST REPORT, para. 15 (1969).
124. The residence bias of the OECD Model discriminated against countries that were
chronically the country of source in unequal income flow situations. Accordingly,
the OECD Model proved unacceptable to developing countries in their negotia-
tions with developed countries. The failure of the OECD Model to accommodate
the needs of developing countries was recognized as the most significant factor in
the slow progress of treaty negotiations between developed and developing coun-
tries. See U.N. MODEL, supra note 105, Commentary.
125. Tax sparing is the treaty concept designed to protect the fiscal incentives found in
the domestic laws of a developing country through an appropriate accommodation
by the treaty partner country. Under the tax sparing principle the developed coun-
try would agree in the tax treaty to allow a credit to their resident taxpayers on
account of a notional amount of taxes that would have been paid to the treaty
partner in the absence of the developing country's tax incentive legislation. For
discussion of the importance of tax sparing to developing countries, see F.N.
Dornelles, The Tax Treaty Needs of Developing Countries with Special Reference to
the UN Draft Model, in U.N. MODEL, supra note 105.
126. See Brian J. Arnold et al., Summary of the Proceedings of an Invitational Seminar
on Tax Treaties in the 21st Century, 50 CAN. TAx. J. 65, 78 (2002) (where interna-
tional tax experts attending a conference in Amsterdam in October, 2001 ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the distinctions, and lack of differences between the
OECD and U.N. Models).
127. Many developing nations-especially Latin American countries-shied away from
entering into bilateral taxation treaties (until the 1990s) due to the perception that
the prevailing rules and norms favored by developed countries represented an un-
acceptable limitation on the nation's jurisdiction to tax income with a legitimate
nexus to the source country. See Arnold et al., supra note 25, at 1981-84.
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C. ANALYSIS OF TAX CONVENTIONS OF PARTIES TO NAFTA
1. Cross-Border Business Income
a. Overview
The tax treaty provisions that apply to multi-jurisdictional business in-
come are among the most important clauses in a tax convention, espe-
cially from a tax revenue perspective. Because it is quite common for
modem business enterprises to carry on commercial activities in two or
more states, tax authorities have developed rules that limit the taxation of
profits earned by non-residents based on a minimum nexus involving bus-
iness contact. 128 The treaty article that deals with the taxation of business
profits utilizes the concept of "permanent establishment" as the standard
for determining the nexus or contact required for source taxation of for-
eign enterprises. A permanent establishment is defined as "a fixed place
of business in which the business of the enterprise is wholly or partly
carried on."'1 29 The bilateral tax convention provision dealing with busi-
ness profits invariably delineates certain factors or activities that establish
the existence of a permanent establishment and expressly excludes other
factors or activities from the applicable treaty definition. 130 If a perma-
nent establishment does not exist within the source country, then the bus-
iness profits will either escape taxation or be taxed only by the residence
country. 131 Where a tax treaty seeks to increase those instances when a
128. OECD MODEL, supra note 119, at Commentary (states that it "has come to be
accepted in international fiscal matters that until an enterprise of one State sets up
a permanent establishment in another State it should not properly be regarded as
participating in the economic life of that other State to such an extent that it comes
within the jurisdiction of that other State's taxing rights."
129. OECD MODEL, supra note 119; U.N. MODEL, supra note 105. This wording is
found in Article 5, paragraph 1 of both the OECD Model and the UN Model.
Most bilateral tax treaties define the term permanent establishment in an article
that is separate from the provisions dealing with the taxation of business profits.
Certain activities, such as the use of facilities or the maintenance of a stock of
goods for the purpose of storage or display, are expressly excluded from the defini-
tion of permanent establishment while other activities of the nonresident enter-
prise, such as the use of certain agents or representatives in the source country, are
deemed to constitute a permanent establishment for the purpose of taxation of
business income.
130. See, e.g., 1977 U.S. Model, supra note 52, art. 5. (defines permanent establishment
as "a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly
or partly carried on" and proceeds to give examples of a permanent establishment,
which would include a place of management, a branch, office, factory, workshop,
mine, oil or gas well, quarry, or any other place of extraction of natural resources.
The U.S. Model then expressly excludes a number of auxiliary activities, such as
"the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery of goods
or merchandise belonging to the enterprise" and "the maintenance of a fixed place
of business solely for the purpose of purchasing goods or merchandise, or of col-
lecting information, for the enterprise.").
131. It is important to note that if the entity is incorporated in the source country, then
it is prima facie considered a resident taxpayer of that country. See, e.g., Canada's
I.T.A. subsection 250(4) (a) (declaring that all companies incorporated in Canada
at any time after April 27, 1965 shall be deemed to be residents of Canada for
income tax purposes). So the tax treaty provisions establishing the taxation of
business profits by a source country are generally only applied to active business
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business will be deemed to have a permanent establishment in the foreign
country and reduce the number of exclusions, the treaty effectively ex-
pands the scope of source country taxation. Conversely, a tax treaty will
have a greater residence country bias if it purports to narrow the defini-
tion of permanent establishment, thereby further limiting taxation in the
country where the income is earned.
Tax treaties typically also establish guidelines for the attribution of bus-
iness income and expenses to the activities of foreign enterprises. Most
model tax conventions provide that business income attributed or con-
nected to a permanent establishment within the source country will be
subject to taxation in accordance with the source country's domestic in-
come tax laws.132 Under U.S. tax law, the profits of a permanent estab-
lishment situated in the United States will be determined as though the
taxpayer was a distinct and separate enterprise engaged in similar activi-
ties under similar conditions and dealing independently of the foreign en-
terprise that owns the establishment. 133 Varying profit attribution rules
could affect the uniformity of tax treatment of transfers between and
among taxpayers.
b. Treatment of Business Profits under the Conventions
(1) Canada- U.S. Convention
The taxation of business profits under the Canada-U.S. Convention
tends to closely follow the text of the OECD Model.134 Profits of an
enterprise of one state will be taxed in the other state only if they can be
attributed to a permanent establishment maintained in the other state. 35
income when a permanent establishment of an unincorporated company or other
foreign entity exists within its borders. It should be noted, though, that multina-
tional enterprises do not necessarily have to carry on most or all of their business
in the jurisdiction of incorporation or registration.
132. OECD Model, supra note 119, art. 7(2); 1977 U.S. Model, supra note 52, art. 7(2).
133. Where a foreign business is resident in a country that has a tax treaty with the
United States, U.S. tax authorities will determine all income and expenses effec-
tively connected with the permanent establishment by treating all transfers and
remittances from foreign parent to the U.S. branch as though the branch was an
arm's length enterprise carrying on the same or similar business as its parent
company.
134. The OECD Model, and most existing bilateral tax treaties, relate the jurisdictional
nexus for the taxation of international business profits to the concept of "perma-
nent establishment." Article VII(1) of the Canada-U.S. Convention sets out the
typical rule for the taxation of multinational business income:
The business profits of a resident of a Contracting State shall be taxable only
in that State unless the resident carries on business in the other Contracting
State through a permanent establishment situated therein. If the resident
carries on, or has carried on, business as aforesaid, the business profits of the
resident may be taxed in the other State but only so much of them as is
attributable to that permanent establishment.
CONVENTION BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNrTED STATES OF AMERICA WrrIH RESPECT
TO TAXEs ON INCOME AND ON CAPTrra., (Sept. 26, 1980), U.S.-Can., art. VII, para. 1.
135. Canada-U.S. Convention, supra note 67, art. 5, para. 1. The treaty does not con-
tain language similar to the force-of-attraction principle found in the Canada-Mex-
ico Convention or the U.S.-Mexico Convention.
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In determining the profits of a permanent establishment, tax authorities
expressly allow the deduction of expenses, including general administra-
tive expenses of the foreign head office, incurred in connection with the
permanent establishment. The treaty maintains that the profits of the
permanent establishment will be determined as if it were a distinct and
separate enterprise engaged in business in the other state. The Canada-
U.S. Convention adopts a narrow definition of permanent establishment
in comparison to the UN Model. By limiting the scope of taxation of
foreign business income by the host country, it could be said that the
Canada-U.S. Convention has a relative residence bias.1 36
(2)Canada-Mexico Convention
The Canada-Mexico Convention utilizes many of the same provisions
found in the Canada-U.S. Convention in respect of the taxation of busi-
ness profits. However, the Canada-Mexico Convention contains several
additional provisions and modifications that effectively grant the source
country increased scope to tax the profits of a foreign enterprise. 137 For
instance, the Canada-Mexico Convention incorporates a variant of the
"force of attraction" principle found in the UN Model by declaring that
the source country will be allowed to tax all income derived by the for-
eign enterprise if the foreigner has a permanent establishment situated in
that country, regardless of whether all income is derived from the perma-
nent establishment. 138 The text of the Convention effectively deems sales
of similar goods by a related or affiliated company that does not have a
permanent establishment in the country to be connected to any perma-
nent establishment of the company in the source country.139
The Canada-Mexico Convention accords Canadian and Mexican resi-
dent enterprises different treatment than businesses based in the United
States. For instance, the Canada-Mexico Convention contains a clause
136. See id. art. 7, para. 3.
137. By expanding the definition of permanent establishment in a manner similar to
that proposed by the UN Model, the Canada-Mexico Convention broadens the
nexus for taxation by the source country. For instance, permanent establishment is
deemed to include a building site, a construction, assembly and installation project
as well as any supervisory activities in connection therewith, if such activities con-
tinue for a period of more than six months. Canada-Mexico Convention, supra
note 71, art. 5, para. 3. By comparison, the OECD Model and the Canada-U.S.
Convention establish a time period of twelve months for such activities.
138. The Canada-Mexico Convention, though, does not go as far as giving the source
country jurisdiction over income derived by purchases of imported goods and elec-
tronic commerce. "No business profits shall be attributed to a permanent estab-
lishment of a person by reason of the mere purchase by the permanent
establishment of goods or merchandise for the person." Canada-Mexico Conven-
tion, supra note 71, art. 7, para. 4.
139. For instance, if a Canadian company with a permanent establishment in Mexico
sells goods directly to customers residing in Mexico and the goods are similar to
goods sold by a Mexican permanent establishment of the Canadian company, the
profits therefrom can be attributed to the permanent establishment and subjected
to Mexican tax, unless the Canadian company can establish that the direct sale was
carried out for a purpose other than to benefit from the treaty provisions.
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not found in the U.S. treaties that expressly prohibits deductions to the
permanent establishment for amounts paid to the head office for items
such as royalties, commissions, management fees, interest (except for
banking enterprises), or similar preferential payments. 140 Furthermore,
the Canada-Mexico Convention provides that facilities used solely for de-
livery of goods or merchandise do not constitute permanent establish-
ments, which provision is apparently aimed at encouraging greater
Canadian participation in the Mexican maquiladora industry.141
(3) U.S.-Mexico Convention
Under the U.S.-Mexico Convention, the calculation of business profits
subject to taxation in the source country as a result of the existence of a
permanent establishment includes income attributable to the permanent
establishment as well as the profits generated from sales of goods or mer-
chandise of the same or similar kind as those that are sold through the
permanent establishment, but only if the sales were carried out in order
to obtain benefits under the treaty.142 This relatively narrow force-of-
attraction principle does not use the same text as the equivalent provision
in the Canada-Mexico Convention. 143
The U.S.-Mexico Convention adopts the arm's length standard of ac-
counting for business profits to be attributed to a permanent establish-
ment. Nonetheless, the Protocol to the U.S.-Mexico Convention permits
each country to apply its domestic law relating to the determination of
the tax liability of the non-resident taxpayer.144 This provision is in-
tended to allow Mexico and the United States to determine the profits
attributable to a permanent establishment under a unitary, profit-split,
ratio-based or other formulary apportionment, if the available informa-
tion does not allow separate-enterprise accounting and the result is con-
sistent with arm's-length principles. 45 It should be emphasized that the
140. Canada-Mexico Convention, supra note 71, art. 7, para. 3. It should be noted that
one of the peculiarities of the Mexican tax system is that most purchases can be
immediately deducted in calculating profits. Monroy, supra note 7, at 742.
141. Canada-Mexico Convention, supra note 71, art. 4, para. 4. Maquiladora refers to a
Mexican entity, usually a wholly-owned subsidiary of a foreign corporation that
assembles, manufactures, or otherwise processes inventory or like property for its
owner. This provision apparently represented an effort to encourage Canadian
businesses to become involved in the maquiladora industry as the overwhelming
bulk of maquiladoras are American owned or controlled. BAKER & MCKENZtE,
DOING Busn'Ess IN MExmco, 2-3 (1992).
142. U.S.-Mexico Convention, supra note 84, art.7, para.1.
143. See Greer L. Phillips & John R. Washlick, The New Income Tax Convention Be-
tween the United States of America and the United Mexican States, TAX NoTEs 1447
(1992) (where article 7, paragraph 1 of the U.S.-Mexico Convention is described
as using the same wording found in the withdrawn 1977 U.S. Model).
144. Reference to domestic tax rules will be permitted in any case where the informa-
tion available to its competent authority is inadequate to determine the profits to
be attributed to the permanent establishment, provided that, on the basis of the
available information, the determination of the profits of the permanent establish-
ment must be consistent with the provisions of the treaty. See U.S.-Mexico Con-
vention, supra note 84, Protocol 1, para. 4.
145. Phillips & Washlick, supra note 143, at 10.
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U.S.-Mexico Convention differs from most of Mexico's other tax
treaties.146
2. Dividends and the Repatriation of Profits
Dividends represent an integral component of foreign direct invest-
ment. Chapter 11 of NAFTA applies the principles of National Treat-
ment and Most-Favored Nation Treatment to direct and portfolio
investments involving parties from its member countries.147 One would
think that since multinational investors view tax policies setting out the
treatment of income and dividends arising out of such investments as im-
portant considerations, the Free Trade Agreement would extend its most
basic treatment principles to the taxation of investment income. How-
ever, income tax measures (including capital gains taxes) are exempted
from the application of the relevant provisions of Chapter 11.148 As a
result, it is once again necessary to determine the tax treatment accorded
to dividends and branch profits under the pertinent bilateral tax treaties
of the parties to NAFTA.
a. Overview
Foreign investment is recognized as a crucial element for the economic
development of many nations throughout North and South America. 149
The United States has always accounted for a substantial amount of for-
eign investment in Canada and Mexico as well as in many other countries
in the hemisphere; Spain and other European countries made considera-
ble investments in Latin America in the late 1990s. 150 In addition to the
146. Not only does the U.S.-Mexico Convention differ from most of Mexico's other
treaties, but the Convention refers to a situation not contemplated by Mexican tax
laws. The Convention definition of permanent establishment states that a U.S.
company that merely maintains inventories for processing by a Mexican person
with assets provided by the U.S. company (such as the maquiladora situation) will
not be deemed to be a permanent establishment. In so far as this particular par-
ent-subsidiary relationship has no basis in Mexico's domestic tax laws, "the treaty
provision is not legally enforceable." Monroy, supra note 7, at 750.
147. NAFTA, supra note 1, paragraph 1102(1) (National Treatment) states: "Each
Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favourable than
it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establish-
ment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other
disposition of investments." Chapter 11 also extends Most-Favored Nation Treat-
ment provisions to investments involving nationals of a NAFTA member country.
148. "Articles 1102 and 1103 (Investment-National Treatment and Most-Favoured Na-
tion Treatment) ... shall apply to all taxation measures, other than those on in-
come, capital gains." NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 2103, para. 4(b).
149. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, foreign
direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean rose to $97 billion in 1999
representing a 32% increase over the previous year. See Matt Moffett, Latin
America Tops Asia in Luring Foreign Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2000, at A21
(indicating that 1998 marked the first year where the flow of investment from Eu-
rope to Latin America surpassed that from the United States).
150. In 1998, U.S. investments in Latin America totalled roughly $14.3 billion, com-
pared with Spanish investments of $11.3 billion; in 1999, Spanish investments in
Latin America rose to almost $20 billion. See generally William Glade, Current
Trends and Problems in Foreign Investment in Latin America, 4 NAFTA: L. &
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benefits that a country derives directly from the foreign investment, the
country receiving foreign investment may be able to obtain tax revenues
from the investment of foreign capital as well as from repatriation of any
profits derived from the investment. 151
Most countries tax the owner or shareholder of an enterprise on divi-
dends and other distributions received from the corporation. Where the
dividends are paid to a non-resident, the domestic tax laws of the country
that is the recipient of the foreign investment (referred to as the source
country in this context) typically imposes a withholding tax obligation on
the payor corporation. The payor company is usually required to with-
hold and remit to the treasury of the source country a certain percentage
of the amount of the gross dividend on behalf of the non-resident share-
holder. .152 The shareholder's country of residence may then include the
dividend as part of the shareholder's income and impose additional tax.
Tax treaties invariably reduce the withholding tax rate imposed by the
source country. The combined amount of tax paid by the entity and its
owners will be largely influenced by the withholding tax rate set out in
the treaty and the domestic tax rates of the respective treaty partners.
The tax treatment of dividend income differs considerably within each
of the NAFTA countries. Most notably, Mexico utilizes the exemption
model for corporate-shareholder integration and, therefore, does not im-
pose any taxes on dividend income.153 The revenue implications of do-
mestic tax laws greatly affected the negotiation of the relevant tax treaty
provisions dealing with dividends. Under the historical territorial princi-
ple, Mexico should have sought to increase source taxation of corporate
distributions. However, as a result of not imposing a withholding tax on
dividends under its domestic tax laws, Mexico appeared in its treaty nego-
Bus. REV. AM. 57, 60 (Spring 1998) (finding that Spanish investment was concen-
trated in the resources, manufacturing and utilities sectors of several Latin Ameri-
can countries). Most notably, the United States continues to be the greatest
investor in telecommunications and e-commerce technologies throughout the
Americas as demonstrated by several high-profile examples of U.S. direct invest-
ment in Latin America. Id
151. Investments by multinational enterprises can deliver a number of the following
benefits to the host country: injection of needed capital; increased employment;
introduction, transfer or spill over of technology; introduction of sophisticated
management skills; increased competition in the host country market; and in-
creased foreign exchange earnings. Eric M. Burt, Developing Countries and the
Framework for Negotiations on Foreign Direct Investment in the World Trade Or-
ganization, 12 AM. U.J. Irrr'L L. & POL'Y 1015, 1021 (1997).
152. Under domestic United States tax law, the withholding tax rate for dividends paid
to a non-resident of a non-treaty country is 30% of the gross dividend, whereas in
Canada the statutory rate is 25% of the gross dividend.
153. In general, profits previously taxed by the Mexico government at the corporate
level are not subject to further taxation and all corporate entities are treated the
same regardless of their organizational structure. Monroy, supra note 7, at 744.
More technically, dividends paid by Mexican corporations out of earnings that
have been subject to corporate income tax are exempt from further taxation when
received by the shareholder, while any dividend in excess of net after-tax profits
will still be exempt from tax in the hands of the shareholder, but will trigger a
compensatory tax on the payor corporation. See Phillips & Washlick, supra note
143, at 1451.
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tiations with Canada and the United States to be most interested in re-
ducing or eliminating the taxation of dividends at source. 154 All three of
the NAFTA treaties stipulate a low rate of withholding tax on the gross
amount of dividends where the shareholder owns a significant percentage
of the payor corporation and a higher level of withholding tax on divi-
dends arising from more passive investments, commonly referred to as
"portfolio dividends. ' 155
Foreign investment does not necessarily involve the use of a corporate
entity. Where a foreign enterprise chooses to carry on its local business
activities in a branch form, there exists the possibility that the enterprise
could avoid the host country's withholding tax that applies to dividends.
In order to minimize this significant tax difference between foreign
branches and incorporated subsidiaries, the host country will strive to tax
any distribution of corporate profits from the branch operation to the
head office. In instances where a foreign branch constitutes a permanent
establishment in the source country, the source country may levy an addi-
tional tax on the profits of the branch that are repatriated to head of-
fice. 156 Most of the tax treaties concluded by Canada and the United
States impose a withholding tax on distributions from a branch office that
is separate from the rate of withholding tax imposed on dividends.
b. Treatment of Dividends and Branch Remittances under the
Conventions
(1) Canada-U.S. Convention
The Canada-U.S. tax treaty provides that the source country shall not
impose a withholding tax on dividends greater than 10 percent if the re-
cipient's share of equity or control in the payor corporation is in excess of
10 percent. In all other cases the source country may impose a withhold-
ing tax of up to 15 percent of the gross dividend payment. 57 The Ca-
nada-U.S. Convention also makes provision for the imposition of a
branch tax of 10 percent of the amount of earnings repatriated by the
branch; however, the effect of the complicated branch tax provision in the
treaty is to reduce the real rate of taxation of branch profits at source to
well below 10 percent. 158
154. See Phillips & Washlick, supra note 143, at 1451.
155. Integration of taxation is one of the most important considerations for wholly-
owned subsidiaries of multinational enterprises whereas there are a variety of fac-
tors that influence the international taxation of portfolio dividends. See DONALD
J. BREAN ET AL, TAXATiON OF INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO INVESTMEN-T, 57-71
(1991).
156. Canada and the United States both impose an additional tax on distributions of
branch profits, which is referred to as a "branch tax." Consistent with its use of the
exemption model of integration Mexico generally does not tax distributions of
branch profits. The imposition of a branch tax has the effect of minimizing the
disincentive to carry on business operations in the parent-subsidiary form.
157. Canada-U.S. Convention, supra note 67, art. 10, para. 2.
158. See Canada-U.S. Convention, supra note 67, art. 10, para. 6 (which defines the
term "earnings" as the excess of business profits attributable to all permanent es-
tablishments for the year and previous years over the sum of: (a) business losses
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(2)Canada-Mexico Convention
The Canada-Mexico Convention restricts the withholding tax rate im-
posed by the source country on dividends paid to non-residents to no
more than 10 percent of the gross amount of the dividends where the
beneficial owner is a company that controls 25 percent or more of the
voting power of the company paying the dividends and to no more than
15 percent of the gross amount of the dividend in all other instances. 159
The Convention also contains a provision that permits each country to
impose a branch tax of up to 10 percent of the earnings of the branch
office situated in the country. 16° The Canada-Mexico Convention further
provides that when determining taxation of dividends in Canada, a tax of
15 percent shall be deemed to have been paid on a dividend paid by a
company that is a resident of Mexico, provided the earnings of the said
company are primarily from business carried on in Mexico.161 This provi-
sion is designed to benefit Canadian investors interested in acquiring an
equity position of a Mexican-based company.
(3) U.S.-Mexico Convention
Under the U.S.-Mexico Convention, the rate of source country taxa-
tion of dividends paid to a corporate shareholder that owns at least ten
percent of the voting stock of the payor cannot exceed 5 percent.162 The
rate of withholding tax for all other dividends will be 15 percent for the
first five years that the Convention is in force and 10 percent thereafter.
The Protocol to the Convention provides Most-Favored Nation Treat-
ment to Mexico. In the event the United States agrees in a treaty with
another country to a withholding tax rate that is lower than 5 percent,
then the lower rate would also apply under the Convention. 63 Mexico
appears to foregoing a considerable amount of revenue due to its failure
to collect withholding tax on international dividend and branch distribu-
tions, particularly when one considers the huge amount of American for-
eign investment in Mexico. 164
attributable to the permanent establishments for such years; (b) all taxes on profits
whether or not covered by the Convention; (c) profits reinvested in the host state;
and (d) $500,000 CDN$ or its equivalent in US$).
159. See Canada-Mexico Convention, supra note 71, art. 10, para.2. The provisions ap-
pear to benefit Canada as Mexico does not impose a withholding tax on distribu-
tions of dividends.
160. Canada-Mexico Convention, supra note 71, art. 10, para. 6.
161. See Canada-Mexico Convention, supra note 71, art. 22, para. 3.
162. U.S.-Mexico Convention, supra note 84, art.10, para.2.
163. U.S.-Mexico Convention, supra note 84, protocol 1, para. 8(b).
164. When NAFTA was signed in 1992 the United States accounted for approximately
61% of Mexico's cumulative foreign direct investment by value; in 1991 alone, the
amount of U.S. direct investment in Mexico was $11.6 billion compared to Mexi-
can direct investment of only $0.6 billion in the United States. Jay Camillo,
Growth Through North American Trade: The Economic Facts, Bus. AM. 12, 13
(Oct. 1992).
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3. Royalties and Payments in Respect of Intellectual Property
a. Overview
NAFTA emphasizes the need for clearly defined intellectual property
rights. Chapter 17 of NAFTA contains various rules that impact on roy-
alty payments, such as literary, dramatic and musical copyrights, and the
protection of intellectual property, such as patents and trademarks. 165
Bilateral income tax treaties rely upon the proper characterization of an
item of income in order to determine the appropriate treatment of the
taxpayers and transactions. Software and e-commerce transactions often
represent a sale or license of a bundle of rights and benefits, so it is not
always clear how the supply and the income derived from the transaction
should be taxed. The characterization of income derived from the licens-
ing or transfer of an intangible good or service represents one of the most
challenging aspects of developing tax rules for the digital environment.
For instance, license fees in connection with the sale of software can be
treated as royalty payments because such payments are essentially remu-
neration for the right to use copyrighted material or they may be treated
as business income in so far as such fees constitute remuneration for sales
of inventory in the ordinary course of business.
If a payment is categorized as a royalty, then the country of source
typically levies a withholding tax on the gross amount of the royalty paya-
ble to the non-resident. The recipient's country of residence (referred to
as the residence country) would generally impose further tax on the roy-
alty payment in accordance with its domestic tax rules for residents and
subject to credit for foreign taxes paid. However, if the payment is
treated as income earned in the course of business, then the tax treat-
ment of such income would change completely. 166
When used in the context of bilateral tax treaties, the term "royalties"
commonly refers to payments for the use of, or the right to use (a) any
copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work and including production
of motion picture and television films; (b) any patents, trademarks and
other rights of a similar nature; and (c) industrial, commercial or scientific
165. The drafters of NAFTA recognized the trade-off between encouraging research
and development through protection of proprietary rights on one hand and the
promotion of free and unfettered trade on the other hand. Chapter 17 (Intellectual
Property), para. 1, declares that: "Each Party shall provide in its territory to the
nationals of another Party adequate and effective protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights, while ensuring that measures to enforce intellectual
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade."
166. See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TAX TREATY CHARACTERIZATION ISSUES ARISING FROM ELECTRONIC COM-
MERCE (Feb. 1, 2001) (reviewing a number of fact scenarios and advising tax au-
thorities of OECD member states to treat most electronic commerce transactions
as generating active business income). The Technical Advisory Group responsible
for the discussion proposals on characterization issues explained that even though
license fees represented the capture and use of digital copyrighted information,
such information was usually just the by-product of the e-commerce transaction
and that the real purpose of most commercial transactions is to earn income for
the business.
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equipment and information in respect thereof. Royalties are generally
sourced with reference to the residence of the payor. If the payor has a
permanent establishment or fixed base in a treaty country that incurs the
liability for the royalty, then the treaty will treat the royalty payment as
having its situs in the country where the permanent establishment or fixed
base is situated. Under both the OECD Model and the U.S. Model, the
residence country has exclusive jurisdiction to tax all royalty payments. 167
Since royalty payments usually flow from developing countries to indus-
trialized developed nations, the approach adopted by the OECD Model
and the U.S. Model would lead to significant losses of tax revenue for
developing countries. By considering the tax treatment accorded royal-
ties under the applicable tax conventions of the parties to NAFTA, it
brings into the focus the tension between pursuit of the fiscal demands of
treaty partners and the objectives of mutual advantage and harmoniza-
tion promoted throughout the Free Trade Agreement.
b. Tax Treatment of Royalties under the Conventions
(1) Canada- U.S. Convention
The Canada-U.S. Convention limits the rate of withholding tax on for-
eign royalties to 10 percent of the gross royalty payment. While this
treaty deviates materially from the treatment accorded royalty income
under both the OECD Model and the U.S. Model, there is a provision in
the Convention exempting royalties arising from the production or repro-
duction of any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work from withhold-
ing tax. Most notably, though, the Canada-U.S. Convention does not
extend the cultural royalty exemption toroyalties relating to motion pic-
tures, television films, and other means of reproduction of television sig-
nals, which continue to be subject to the treaty's withholding tax rate of10%.168
(2)Canada-Mexico Convention
The Canada-Mexico Convention provides for the country of source to
impose a withholding tax of no more than 15 percent on royalties paid to
foreign residents. The Protocol to the Convention states that if pursuant
to a treaty concluded with a member of the OECD, Mexico agrees to a
rate of withholding tax on royalties that is lower than 15 percent, such
lower rate (but not below 10 percent) shall apply with respect to taxation
167. See, e.g., OECD Model, supra note 119, art. 12 (supporting exclusive residence
country taxation of royalty payments on the grounds that the recipient of the roy-
alty should be allowed over the long term to match its research and development
costs against its royalty income regardless of where such expenses and revenues
were incurred).
168. Canada claims that the balance of royalty payments, especially in respect of mo-
tion pictures, television films and video reproduction, is weighted too heavily in
favour of the United States to permit exclusive residence country taxation. See
CANADA'S TAX TREATmS, supra note 69.
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of royalties.169 The Canada-Mexico Convention exempts from taxation
in the source country all copyright royalties and other like payments in
respect of the production or reproduction of any cultural, dramatic, musi-
cal or other artistic work. The exemption for cultural royalties does not
extend to royalties in respect of motion picture films or reproductions for
use in videos or television.170
(3) U.S.-Mexico Convention
The U.S.-Mexico Convention permits the source country to tax royalty
payments at a rate of 10 percent of the gross amount of the royalty. 71
Most importantly, the U.S.-Mexico Convention differs from the other
two bilateral tax treaties between NAFTA signatories by failing to ex-
empt any form of royalty payment from taxation in the source country.
In order to conclude this treaty with Mexico, it was clear that the United
States had to move away from its objective of zero withholding at source
as established by the U.S. Model. Nonetheless, the United States did suc-
ceed in limiting taxation of royalties at source to 10 percent, which repre-
sented a significant reduction from the withholding tax rates that would
have been imposed under Mexican tax law in the absence of a tax treaty.
4. Income from Independent Personal Services
a. Overview
NAFTA applies the basic trade principles of National Treatment and
Most-Favored Nation Treatment to the performance of services across
borders.172 The taxation of income derived from cross-border trade in
services is, to a certain extent, integrated within the Free Trade Agree-
ment.173 In this respect, the harmonization and integration of rules for
the service sector has been cited as one of the most notable benefits of
NAFTA. 174 The taxation of personal services represents an area where
North American tax authorities have interacted with NAFTA trade rep-
169. As the Protocol to the Canada-Mexico Convention contains a Most-Favored Na-
tion provision that applies to royalties, the subsequent ratification of the U.S.-
Mexico Convention effectively reduced the rate of withholding tax in the Canada-
Mexico Convention to 10%. Although the objective of harmonization appears to
have been promoted in respect of the withholding tax rate, the exemption and
inclusion provisions in respect of the taxation of royalties differ from treaty to
treaty.
170. Canada-Mexico Convention, supra note 71, art. 12, para. 3.
171. U.S.-Mexico Convention, supra note 84, art. 12, para.2.
172. Article 1202 of NAFTA states: "Each Party shall accord to service providers of
another party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circum-
stances, to its own service providers."
173. Article 2103(4)(a) of NAFTA extends the application of the National Treatment
provisions of NAFTA Article 1202 (Cross-Border Trade in Services-National
Treatment) to taxation measures on income.
174. In requiring its Member States to commit to exchanges in services in the roughly
the same manner as trading of goods, NAFTA goes beyond the World Trade Or-
ganization's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which does not
require countries to make any basic commitment to free trade in services. See
Mann, supra note 6, at 226-28.
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resentatives in an effort to harmonize the treatment of cross-border ex-
changes of services.
Remuneration derived by individuals from the performance of services
must be classified under most bilateral tax treaties as either (a) income
from dependent personal services, or (b) income from the performance of
independent personal services. Most countries accept the principle that a
nation has a legitimate claim to impose tax on income derived from the
exercise of dependent personal services, such as office and employment
income within its boundaries.' 75 However, where personal services are
independent in nature, the income derived by such services are treated
akin to business profits. All of the NAFTA tax conventions treat inde-
pendent personal service income derived by non-residents in a manner
similar to the taxation of business profits. Income derived from the exer-
cise of professional services and other services of an independent nature
will be taxed in the source country only if the foreigner maintains a physi-
cal presence in the host country. Whereas the concept of permanent es-
tablishment is usually reserved for commercial activities of a corporate
nature, the equivalent concept of "fixed base" applies to the taxation of
income from independent personal services. 176
The fixed base requirement generally provides that a host country will
only tax income from independent personal services performed by a non-
resident if the non-resident uses a fixed base in the host country to per-
form the services. Many countries, particularly developing countries,
have expressed the view that the existence of a fixed base requirement
for taxation by the host country is not justifiable in principle. 177 Their
arguments eventually resulted in modifications to the standard fixed base
test becoming more commonplace. Therefore, treaties impose additional
requirements that must be satisfied prior to the country asserting the
right to tax income from personal services of an independent nature. For
instance, some bilateral tax treaties assign exclusive jurisdiction to tax
personal service income to the service provider's country of residence
only if the service provider is not present in the host country for a speci-
fied time period, usually 183 days.
b. Tax Treatment under NAFTA Conventions
(1)Canada-U.S. Convention
The Canada-U.S. Convention sets out the basic rule that income from
independent personal services may only be taxed in the source country if
the individual has or had a fixed base regularly available to him or her in
175. See Robert J. Patrick Jr., A Comparison of the United States and OECD Model
Income Tax Conventions, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 650, 673 (1980).
176. Although many treaties do not define the term "fixed base," the international con-
sensus is that it is similar to permanent establishment and would include facilities
such as a physician's consulting room and the offices of a lawyer or an accountant.
See U.N. MODEL, supra note 105, Commentary to art. 14.
177. See U.N. Model, supra note 105, Commentary to art. 14.
2003] FREE TRADE, TAXATION, AND THE INTERNET 555
the source country. 178 If it is determined that the taxpayer has a fixed
base in the country where the income is earned, the source country may
tax only the income that is attributable to the fixed base of the taxpayer
in the country.
(2)Canada-Mexico Convention
The Canada-Mexico Convention provides that if a resident of Canada
or Mexico has a fixed base regularly available in the other country for the
purpose of performing professional services or other activities of an inde-
pendent nature, then the other country may tax the income that is attrib-
utable to the fixed base. In addition to establishing the general rule
found in the equivalent section of the Canada-U.S. Convention, the Ca-
nada-Mexico Convention applies a presence test for the taxation of inde-
pendent service income. The taxpayer will be considered to have a fixed
base in the source country if throughout any twelve-month period the
resident is present in that country for more than 183 days in aggregate.179
Thereby the Canada-Mexico Convention provision for taxation of inde-
pendent personal services provides a moderately broader scope for
source country taxation than the other two bilateral treaties governed by
NAFTA.
(3) U.S.-Mexico Convention
The U.S.-Mexico Convention treats income from the performance of
independent personal services in a similar manner to the treatment ac-
corded such income under Mexico's treaty with Canada. However, the
U.S.-Mexico Convention (unlike the Canada-Mexico Convention) does
not make any reference to length of stay as a condition for taxation of the
foreigner by the host country.
The Conventions between NAFTA member countries are relatively
consistent in their tax treatment of income from independent personal
services. By treating income from the performance of independent ser-
vices in the same manner as business profits, each of the NAFTA Con-
ventions restricts the right of the source country to levy tax on the
income, unless the taxpayer has a fixed base in the source jurisdiction.
The simple extension of the Free Trade Agreement's National Treatment
principle to the taxation of service income effectively contributed to the
promotion of uniform treatment in the supporting bilateral tax treaties.
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
"New conditions require new rules of fair trading, and since condi-
tions always change and evolve, the Heaven of totally free trade is - as
178. Canada-U.S. Convention, supra note 67, art. 14.
179. Canada-Mexico Convention, supra note 71, art. 14, para.1.
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Pope said- always just beyond our grasp. "180
A. E-COMMERCE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Only a few years after NAFTA was concluded, the Internet revolution
led to the computer being a mainstay in many North American homes
and offices. Fully anticipating the revolutionary and rapid impact of in-
formation technologies would have been difficult when the text of the
Free Trade Agreement was completed in 1992. NAFTA negotiations fo-
cused on the trade of physical goods and services across clearly drawn
borders. The surging popularity of the Internet and the recent growth of
e-commerce dramatically changed the nature and economics of global
business. 18 1 Digital transactions blur the application of international
trade and tax rules in so far as electronic commerce does not adapt nicely
to conventional trade agreement definitions and concepts. The unprece-
dented technological developments of the past few years have had a
greater impact on the globalisation of economic trade than the drafters of
NAFTA could have envisaged. 182 NAFTA, like many other agreements
of its era, fails to adequately address a variety of complex issues that have
arisen as a result of the growth of electronic commerce. 183 This section
will briefly discuss the various tensions that co-exist in the effort to bring
electronic commerce within the scope of international trade negotiations.
1. International Efforts to Respond to E-Commerce
Several multilateral organizations have addressed the challenges and
issues for the taxation of electronic commerce. The Organization for Ec-
onomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is the primary multilat-
eral organization developing rules and policies to adapt tax measures to
electronic commerce.'8 4 Canada, Mexico, and the United States all be-
long to the OECD, which is also at the forefront of discussions relating to
the economic and social impact of e-commerce.' 8 5 The United Nations
180. Richard 0. Cunningham, NAFTA in the Global Context, 23 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 379, 382
(1997) (where the author indicates that electronic commerce will probably exag-
gerate the conflict or tension between those that favor unimpeded trade and those
that perceive the need to use trade restrictions as a lever for social or political
objectives).
181. For a discussion on the economics of e-commerce, see ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
AND DEVELOPMENT, U.N. COMMISSION ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 14-16,
available at http://www.unctad.org.
182. See generally DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INTELLECrUAL His-
TORY OF FREE TRADE (1995).
183. See THOMAS ANDREW O'KEEFE, LATIN AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS (1997);
and Claudio Grossman, The Evolution of Free Trade in the Americas: NAFTA Case
Studies, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 687 (1996).
184. Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD, ELECrRONIC COMMERCE: A DISCUSSION PA-
PER ON TAXATION ISSUES (Paris: OECD, Sept., 1998), 18, para. 38 (the OECD
claims that "problems concerning the application of consumption taxes are gener-
ally recognised as having more immediacy than the issues concerning direct
taxation.").
185. See OECD, The Economic and Social Impact of Electronic Commerce: Prelimi-
nary Findings and Research Agenda 12 (1999). The OECD is a multilateral organ-
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Commission on International Trade Law offers a model law on electronic
commerce with particular focus on the legality of the electronic con-
tract. 186 The Organization of American States, together with free trade
and business alliances, has organized a group to respond to the legal ob-
stacles to electronic commerce in Latin America. 187 Already, different
determinations and classifications in respect of e-commerce have
emerged as a point of conflict in trade negotiations involving the United
States and other countries.188 NAFTA avoids some, but not all, of the
trade nuances relating to the classification of e-commerce goods because
it purports to treat trade in services in a manner relatively similar to trade
in goods. Early indications are that the classification conflicts taking
place in other international trade forums may find a new battlefield in the
FTAA.189
2. Online Transactions Involving Physical Goods
E-commerce can be readily distinguished into an exchange of either a
tangible product or an intangible product. 90 It should be noted that in so
far as e-commerce involves the sale or purchase of physical goods and
services, the usual provisions of the Free Trade Agreement would apply.
So, where the computer is used to promote the sale of tangible goods and
services in the marketplace, it is comparable to other modern telecommu-
nication devices, such as telephone and facsimile machines. E-commerce
transactions involving the sale and delivery of physical goods and services
should be treated, for trade purposes, in the same manner as traditional
goods and services. 19' From a tax perspective, e-commerce involving tan-
ization comprised of thirty member countries that share "a commitment to
democratic government and the market economy." Documents and objectives
available at http://www.oecd.org.
186. Mann, supra note 6, at 221-22.
187. The Organization of American States, the National Law Center for Inter-Ameri-
can Free Trade and the Business Software Alliance jointly organized a conference
in 1999 entitled RESPONDING TO THE LEGAL OBSTACLES TO ELECTRONIC COM-
MERCE IN LATIN AMERICA, available at http://www.natlaw.com/ecommerce/index.
htm.
188. Generally, the United States has pursued a broader definition of goods in trade
discussions in order to include Internet products under the stringent requirements
of GAiT whereas other countries argue that electronic deliveries constitute trade
in services and should be governed by GATS. Mann, supra note 6, at 222.
189. The European Union and the World Trade Organization apply different standards
to "goods" and to "services." See Catherine L. Mann & Sarah Cleeland Knight,
Electronic Commerce in the World Trade Organization, in THE WTO AFTER SEAT-
TLE 19 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000); William Drake & Kalypson Nicoliades, The
Information Revolution and Services Trade Liberalization After 2000, in GATS
2000: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION 241 (Pierre Sauve &
Robert Stern eds., 2000).
190. This section will focus exclusively on the use of the Internet and other modern
technologies for the transfer or purchase of tangible products.
191. Tangible or physical goods ordered over the Internet are usually subject to the
same system of taxes and tariffs that apply to goods ordered over the telephone or
through a mail order catalogue. For the most part, the collection of sales taxes and
import duties on physical goods usually occurs at the border between countries.
The e-commerce purchaser of a physical product will typically have to pay any
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gible products still presents a series of challenges for tax authorities be-
cause the prevailing system of international income taxation is predicated
on the correlation between sales activity and a physical presence in the
market jurisdiction. While the application of National Treatment and
other basic trade principles to increasingly global businesses has been rec-
ognized as an important element of future international trade negotia-
tions, the necessity of according uniform tax treatment to e-commerce as
a mechanism to remove trade impediments has received scant
attention.192
3. The Impact of the Global Digital Divide on Trade Issues
The United States is recognized as the world leader in electronic com-
merce, telecommunications, and information technologies. Nonetheless,
the U.S. is plagued by considerable digital disparity among its own citi-
zenry. 193 On an international level, the differences between the techno-
logical "haves" and "have-nots" give rise to a "global digital divide"
characterized by huge worldwide discrepancies in information technolo-
gies, electronic commerce, and Internet use. 194 The substantial disparity
in Internet use and electronic commerce between the United States, on
one hand, and Mexico and other Latin American countries, on the other
hand, raises concern about the future of international trade negotiations
within a digital environment. 195
While the United States has been proactive in introducing electronic
commerce into regional trade negotiations, the growing digital divide
within the hemisphere has contributed to disapproval or outright rejec-
tion of most U.S. proposals.196 The perception in many developing coun-
applicable sales or transaction taxes upon the entry of the good into the buyer's
country. For instance, since all taxable supplies into Canada are subject to a fed-
eral goods and services tax of 7%, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency col-
lects the GST together with any applicable provincial retail sales or harmonized
sales tax upon the product entering into Canada. Mexico similarly imposes a
value-added tax on goods, services and other imports of tangible and intangible
products into Mexico. The general rate of Mexico's VAT is 15%, but the rate is
reduced to 10% along the border area with exemptions provided for exported
products. Monroy, supra note 7, at 743.
192. See Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Commerce and the Symbiotic Relationship Between
International and Domestic Law Reform, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1931 (1998) (where it is
claimed that the advent of electronic commerce requires a symbiotic relationship
between domestic and international legal reforms, trade policies and disparate le-
gal systems).
193. See CLINTON-GoRE, supra note 9.
194. See Spectar, supra note 9.
195. For a detailed study of electronic commerce issues in Latin America, see Electronic
Commerce in the Western Hemisphere: An Ongoing Series, Inter-American Trade
Report, available at http://www.natlaw.combulletin/1999.
196. For evidence of how the U.S. and EU have alienated developing countries by de-
manding international consensus on Internet regulation, see Steven M. Hanley,
International Internet Regulation: A Multinational Approach, 16 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 997 (1998). For a discussion of the conflicting positions
adopted by the United States and less developed countries in respect of the nor-
mative framework established by the "New World Information and Communica-
tions Order," see Spectar, supra note 9.
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tries appears to be that U.S. efforts at bringing e-commerce into an
international trade regime have been motivated by self-interest. 19 7 Mex-
ico, though, has adopted a different stance on technology issues than
some of its Latin American counterparts by embracing the need to bring
e-commerce within the framework of international free trade. 98 Some
have argued that Mexico's nascent but growing e-commerce sector may
finally be prepared to take genuine advantage of the global trade pos-
sibilities provided by NAFTA. 199
Whether electronic commerce will be a boon for the emerging econo-
mies of Latin America remains to be seen. The revolution of the Internet
provides global accessibility to information technologies, the underlying
products, and a whole series of new markets.2 0° The global digital divide
prevents less developed countries from taking advantages of the eco-
nomic efficiencies associated with new technologies. Nations appear
united in their intention to narrow the information and communications
gap between developed and developing countries, but have varying opin-
ions as to how to attain this goal.201 At the very least, the existence of the
global digital divide highlights the importance of tax and trade rules
based on the concept of mutual advantage. International trade agree-
ments that address electronic commerce concerns in an equitable manner
would go a long way towards assuaging the fears of developing coun-
tries.20 2 U.S. dominance of electronic commerce will, at least in the short
run, necessitate the implementation of proactive international trade rules
that apply to e-commerce while recognizing the need to preserve the eco-
197. "Major trading nations, led by the United States, have systematically exercised a
sort of neomercantilist strategy by introducing electronic commerce into global
trading arrangements to enhance their own wealth, power and market access at the
expense of others." Wiwit Wirsatyo, E-Commerce at Global Negotiation,
JAKARTA POST (Mar. 31, 1999) (where it is claimed that developing countries are
worried because as a result of their relative lack of technological capacity, they will
become e-commerce consumers rather than producers, which will lead to the ero-
sion of local and national languages and cultures).
198. For instance, former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo claimed that e-commerce
had the potential to spur crucial economic growth for developing countries, and
that "the biggest betrayal of those poorest people would be to try to tell them that
you don't need electronic commerce, or suggest to them one way of getting some-
thing out of the WTO is to block electronic commerce." WTO Chief, Mexico Pres-
ident: Free Trade Failure Only Hurts Poor, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS SERV. (Jan. 28,
2000).
199. See Brendan M. Case, Mexican E-Ventures: Businesses South of Border Discover-
ing Potential Online, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 12, 2000, at D1; see also RE-
PORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS TO MINISTERS, FrAA JOINT GOvERNMENT-
PRIVATE SECTOR COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON ELECrRONIC COMMERCE, available
at http://www.ftaa-alca.org.
200. Mann, supra note 6, at 222 (indicating that the Internet has created unique, new
and substantial markets in time, geography and information).
201. See Spectar, supra note 9.
202. See Willingham, supra note 5, at 492, 493 & 506 (where it is argued that the FTAA
should be doing more to promote e-commerce infrastructure development within
its member countries because only two-Canada and the United States-of the
thirty-four FTAA countries are currently in any position to take advantage of the
electronic commerce revolution).
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nomic interests of the less technologically sophisticated. 203 With respect
to the argument in this article for greater tax integration within NAFTA,
the guiding principle in developing such tax rules must be the distribution
of revenues from global commerce in a manner that is fair and advanta-
geous to the fiscal interests of the source or market country.
B. ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND THE CHALLENGE
TO TAX AUTHORITIES
This section briefly explains why tax authorities are reporting serious
difficulties in administering and collecting taxes in a digital environ-
ment.2°4 E-commerce transactions involving intangible goods and ser-
vices present a series of challenges for most tax administrations. The
anonymous nature of the Internet plagues tax authorities that need to
identify taxpayers and taxable transactions in order to collect an income
tax. The greatest difficulties faced by some governments, particularly in
the United States, pertain to the collection of sales, use, and other trans-
action taxes.20 5 This section concludes by highlighting the awkward re-
sponses of international tax authorities that attempt to bring e-commerce
203. See Willingham, supra note 5, at 500.
204. While it is admittedly difficult to estimate tax losses connected to e-commerce, the
United States General Accounting Office projected revenue losses at between $1
billion and $12.4 billion for the year 2003 due to states and localities being unable
to tax e-commerce sales. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SALES TAxES:
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE GROWTH PRESENTS CHALLENGES, REVENUE LOSSES
ARE UNCERTAIN (June 2000), at 20-21. See also Austan Goolsbee & Jonathan
Zittrain, Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Taxing Internet Commerce, NAT'L
TAX J. 413,413-28 (1999) (estimating a loss to U.S. state treasuries of less than 2%
of current state revenues). For a more international perspective, see Susan Telt-
scher, Revenue Implications of Electronic Commerce: Issues of Interest to Devel-
oping Countries, UNCTAD (Apr. 2000) (calculating a loss of tax revenues of
approximately one per cent overall with significant variance among countries).
205. The United States is probably the best example of how Internet taxation-or more
appropriately the lack of coherent tax rules-has created problems for tax authori-
ties and increased compliance costs for multi-jurisdictional enterprises. The re-
placement of traditional retailers with "e-tailers" has contributed to huge revenue
losses throughout various levels of government. The U.S. Treasury acknowledged
that e-commerce would adversely impact the collection of state and local tax reve-
nues. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, SELECTED TAX POLICY IMPLICA-
TIONS OF GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1996). The multiplicity of states,
counties, cities, towns and special districts that impose sales, use and other transac-
tion taxes without a uniform base tremendously increases the complexity of com-
plying with tax laws in the United States. Out of concern that conflicting and
overlapping sales and use taxes would hinder the growth of electronic commerce,
then President Clinton's declared that: "We cannot allow 30,000 state and local taxjurisdictions to stifle the Internet." U.S. GOvERNMENT WORKING GROUP ON
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT (1998). Under the auspices of
allowing e-commerce to grow without being stifled by new or additional state
taxes, in 1998 the U.S. Congress passed the INTERNET TAX FREEDOM ACT, Public
Law No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). The federal legislation, which restricts
state and local tax authorities from imposing any new or discriminatory taxes in-
volving Internet access, electronic commerce or related digital technologies, was
renewed for a further two year term in November 2001 and is now due to expire in
November 2003.
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profits into the tax fold by focusing on the fiscal attributes of the
technology.
1. The Difficulties of Taxing Intangible Goods and Services
The quintessential electronic commerce transaction involves the sale
and delivery of intangible products and services through the use of com-
puter networks. Music, video games, software, pornography, gambling,
banking, and travel services are some of the most popular items procured
over the Internet. Electronic commerce represents a challenge to tax au-
thorities because the whole process of marketing, distribution, payment,
and delivery of an intangible good or service can be completed electroni-
cally without the need for physical delivery of the product or human con-
tact between the consumer and the e-commerce vendor. The intangible
nature of electronic commerce eliminates the paper trail that is a funda-
mental component of international tax audit and verification practices of
most modern self-reporting systems.
E-commerce transactions involving intangible goods and services have
had a significant effect on the consumption tax base of each of the
NAFTA countries. It is far more difficult to collect sales and other trans-
action taxes on digital products or services using traditional sourcing
rules. 206 The determination of the appropriate taxing jurisdiction is par-
ticularly problematic for intangible e-commerce transactions. Business
conducted over the Internet blurs the importance of national borders.
The relatively anonymous nature of the Internet befuddles tax authori-
ties by obscuring the existence of cross-border transactions.207 Theoreti-
cally, little justification can be proffered to support the claim of the
jurisdiction that hosts the e-commerce business to apply its taxes on the
remote sales of the e-commerce business. From a practical perspective, it
is extremely difficult for the jurisdiction where the consumer resides to
impose its sales and use taxes on digital products and services
downloaded or consumed by its residents in the same manner as the taxa-
tion of tangible equivalents.
Business-to-business trade generally accounts for about 80 percent of
all e-commerce. 208 Businesses increasingly order and deliver products
and services by electronic means. In many cases, related companies
206. See Schadewald & Kaye, supra note 36, at 355.
207. In so far as it is difficult to tax something that does not exist, it is comparably
challenging to request information that may not be available. So, although North
American nations have executed bilateral exchange of information agreements
with most of their major trading partners, it is unclear whether any of these agree-
ments could be effectively applied to obtain verifiable digital information.
208. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONONuC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE Ec-
ONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: PRELIMINARY FINo-
INGS AND RESEARCH AGENDA, 50-51 (1999) (even though the e-commerce
business-to-consumer sector is growing exponentially in North America, the sector
is still only one-quarter of the business-to-business sector in North America and
has not reached the retail e-commerce penetration levels of Sweden and a few
other European countries).
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share, lend, or give each other the right to use or mutually benefit from
intellectual property rights, information technologies, and other in-
tangibles owned by the group. The exponential growth in the amount of
trade and transfer of goods and services in the business-to-business sector
has led to serious concerns regarding the manipulation of transfer prices
by related companies, particularly in respect of intangible goods and ser-
vices.20 9 The adoption of similar transfer pricing rules among the Mem-
ber States of NAFTA would go a long way towards relieving ambiguities
and disparities in the treatment of tangible and intangible cross-border
business transactions.210
International trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization
have been deeply affected by decisions to classify intangible e-commerce
products as goods or services. 2 1' While NAFJ'A does distinguish be-
tween the cross-border trading of goods and the international delivery of
services, the Free Trade Agreement generally applies both the National
Treatment principle and Most-Favored Nation Treatment to the trade of
goods and to services in a manner not found in other international trade
agreements.2 12 The United States appears to be particularly interested in
ensuring that the classification of an electronic transaction as involving
the sale of either an intangible good or service is included in its interna-
tional trade agreements. 21 3
2. Identification Problems on the Internet
Taxpayer identification is considered a fundamental prerequisite for
the imposition of income taxation in most countries. 214 However, tax au-
209. See David L. Forst, Old and New Issues in the Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711 (1999); U.S. GovERNMENT WORKING GROUP ON ELEC-
TRONIC COMMERCE, TOwARDs DIGITAL EQUALITY, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT
(1999).
210. Cockfield, supra note 4, at 67 (suggesting that Canada and Mexico consider adopt-
ing the transfer pricing rules currently in use in the United States).
211. Mann, supra note 6, at 226 (explaining how the distinction between "goods" and
"services" creates schisms in international trade agreements that are becoming
particularly acute when attempts are made to classify an intangible product as ei-
ther a good or as a service). The distinction is particularly important under the
WTO regime because GATT requires signatories to commit to free trade in goods
whereas the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that came into
force in 1993 does not require signatories to make any basic or comprehensive
commitment to free trade in services.
212. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1997); Richard N. Snape & Malcolm
Bosworth, Advancing Services Negotiations, in THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:
CHALLENGES AHEAD (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1996).
213. See Mann, supra note 6, at 227 (U.S. trade representatives recognize that "the
complex nature of bundled transactions will create huge problems in classifying
these transactions as goods or services, and within services, by which delivery
mode").
214. GovERNMENT OF CANADA, MINISTER'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE, ELECTrRONIC COMMERCE AND CANADA'S TAX ADMINISTRATION: A
REPORT TO THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE FROM THE MINISTER'S ADVI-
SORY CoMMrTrEE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, 4.1.1. (1998) (determined that
four tasks were absolutely essential to effectively administering an income tax sys-
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thorities find it difficult to identify taxpayers in an e-commerce transac-
tion. The lack of reliable identification mechanisms lead to problems for
determination of tax liability and undermines efforts to collect the tax
from the taxpayer. Very few government controls are in place to govern
the electronic transmission and purchase of goods or services. Domain
names and Web sites supply little information about the legal entities be-
hind them. Even if an e-mail address can be clearly associated with a
certain party, the address does not specify either the physical location of
the computer or the identity of the person actually using the computer.
Without appropriate identification mechanisms, it is extremely difficult
for governments to trace the productive processes of a digital transaction
from the e-commerce vendor through to the end consumer. The ability of
Internet users to prevent identification of their e-commerce transactions
presents serious practical challenges for tax authorities that need to iden-
tify and collect the amount of taxes legally due upon the transaction. Na-
tional tax authorities need to determine with relative certainty the
location and legal identities of e-commerce buyers and sellers. Any fu-
ture trade agreement must acknowledge the need of national tax authori-
ties to establish the correlative identity of web hosts and taxpayers in e-
commerce transactions in order to administer an effective tax system.
3. Elimination of Intermediaries and the Threat to Tax Collection
The digital delivery of intangible goods and services acutely under-
mines the collection of both transaction taxes and income taxes by elimi-
nating or redefining the role of intermediaries. Traditional intermediaries
serve as important sources of audit and verification information. The dig-
ital revolution has changed the nature of global business. Retailers and
financial institutions have historically acted as audit and collection points
for national governments. In many sectors private businesses have been
conscripted to collect sales taxes from consumers on behalf of the state.
Tax authorities rely upon various audit points as sources of information
with respect to taxpayers and transactions. These "bricks and mortar"
organizations serve as important intermediaries for the collection of
transaction taxes.215 E-commerce circumvents the traditional collection
and distribution process. Consumers and businesses can download
software or other intangible property directly from the vendor's Web site.
Even tangible products ordered online can be shipped directly from the
seller's warehouse to the purchaser without the need for further middle-
men. The lack of an audit trail in the channels of electronic commerce is
particularly troublesome under a self-reporting tax system.216
tem: (1) identification of taxpayer; (2) identification of taxable transactions; (3)
proving a link between taxpayer and taxable transactions; and (4) collection of tax
from the taxpayer).
215. See Forgione, supra note 10, at 723-24.
216. North American governments require their taxpayers to accurately report and re-
mit their own income taxes under threat of audit and penalties for default. E-
commerce, in itself, undermines the veracity of the government's audit threat.
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The elimination of intermediaries in the electronic commerce sales and
distribution process has had an acute impact on the sales tax regime of
the U.S. states. The tax collection problems currently encountered by
state tax authorities is due primarily to the U.S. Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the constitutional limitation on state and local governments
that restricts the imposition of collection responsibility for indirect taxes,
such as sales and use taxes, on remote vendors.2 17 Although the U.S.
Supreme Court dealt with a fact case that involved out-of-state mail order
vendors, e-commerce businesses have relied upon the principles estab-
lished by the Court to avoid the payment of sales tax on Internet sales of
tangible and intangible goods and services. State tax authorities have re-
sponded by limiting the scope of the physical presence standard and look-
ing to whether the electronic commerce transaction utilizes any
intermediary or other device that may have a situs in the state, which has
led to considerable uncertainty as to whether U.S. state sales and use
taxes must be collected by out-of-state e-commerce vendors.2 18
4. E-Commerce and the Permanent Establishment Concept
Under the current system of international taxation, the determination
of the degree of contact or nexus between an electronic commerce ven-
dor and a state is critical because it ultimately decides the incidence of
taxation as well as the jurisdiction to tax the profits derived by the ven-
dor. Domestic laws invariably focus on the nature and the frequency of
Moreover, the prospect of the use of electronic cash presents another great con-
cern to tax authorities. The absence of financial reporting from intermediaries
presents one of the principal challenges to the tax system arising out of e-cash
transactions. E-cash potentially removes another audit point and important source
of information.
217. See National Bella Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753,87 S. Ct.
1389 (1967) (where the United State Supreme Court established the physical pres-
ence requirement as a prerequisite for state taxation of remote vendors). The sub-
stantial nexus test enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in National Bella Hess
was effectively confirmed through a more modem application of the physical pres-
ence nexus requirement by the Supreme Court 25 years later in Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
218. Quill Corp. was a mail order house with no physical plant or office situated in
North Dakota. The State sought to collect its use taxes on products purchased and
used by its residents. Even though the United States Supreme Court found that
Quill Corp. purposefully directed substantial activities towards residents of North
Dakota, the Court held that the safe harbour provisions of the Commerce Clause
required a substantial nexus for the imposition of indirect state taxation. See Quill
Corp. v. N. Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). Presumably, the application of the physi-
cal presence requirement would also apply to remote vendors of e-commerce.
Nonetheless, some state courts have been reluctant to apply Quill Corp. beyond its
clear facts. Consider Orvis Co. Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 654 N.E.2d 954, cert.
denied 116 S. Ct. 518 (1995) (where two Vermont companies with no physical pres-
ence in New York except for several visits by sales representatives were held liable
for New York State's use tax). For a review of how state courts appear to be
limiting the Supreme Court's physical presence test to state use tax collection of
remote mail order vendors, see Michael T. Fatale, State Tax Jurisdiction and the
Mythical "Physical Presence" Constitutional Standard, 54 TAx LAW. 105 (2000).
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the business being conducted by the non-resident enterprise. 219 By con-
trast, the concept of permanent establishment is the prevailing norm for
determining tax jurisdiction under the bilateral tax treaty provision deal-
ing with business profits. The treaty criteria of permanent establishment
infers a physical presence nexus and disregards the considerations of do-
mestic tax law that focus on the frequency, duration, and significance of
the business activities of the foreign entity operating within the country's
borders.
Electronic commerce undermines the efficacy of any tax standard
based on physical presence. The Internet allows multinational enter-
prises to conduct regular, frequent, and substantial sales in a foreign
country without ever having to establish a fixed base or permanent estab-
lishment in the market country. Recent efforts to expand the permanent
establishment definition to include Internet servers seem misguided.220
By focusing on the physical location of the computer server, tax authori-
ties ignore the underlying productive aspects of the e-commerce technol-
ogy. The most essential mechanism in a digital transaction is not the
hardware, but the software that enables the business to conduct its dis-
play, sales, and delivery functions. The preoccupation of international tax
authorities with the application of a physical standard to an intangible
business method sidesteps the need to introduce a new concept that ad-
dresses the economic realities of the digital age. 221
Countries continue to adhere to the permanent establishment concept
because it blatantly limits taxation of multinational business profits by the
source country. The use of physical presence as the treaty nexus for taxa-
tion of global business profits arose as an alternative to the source princi-
ples enunciated in the Mexico Draft.222 Developing countries already
219. Domestic tax authorities must, in the absence of an applicable tax treaty, make
determinations of whether an entity is carrying on a business or trade in the
jurisdiction.
220. In February, 2001, the OECD-an organization of which Canada, Mexico, and the
United States are members-released a report that proposed to include web serv-
ers within the treaty definition of permanent establishment by adding paragraph
17 to the Commentary on Article 5 of the OECD Model. See OECD, ATTRIBu-
TIONS OF PROFIT TO A PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT INVOLVED IN ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE TRANSFERS, 42.3-9 (2001). Some OECD countries, notably Spain and
Portugal, favored extending the definition of permanent establishment to encom-
pass Web sites and/or local Web servers operated by domestic ISPs on behalf of
foreign companies.
221. In contrast to the directives released by the OECD and the tax administrations of
many of its members, the Government of India released a report that expressed
futility with the notion of pigeonholing e-commerce transactions into the existing
definition of permanent establishment. "[T]he concept of [permanent establish-
ment] should be abandoned and a serious attempt should be made within OECD
or the U.N. to find an alternative to the concept of [permanent establishment]."
INDIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE, REPORT OF THE HIGH POWERED COMMITTEE ON E-
COMMERCE AND TAXATION, 12 (2001) [hereinafter INDIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE].
222. The practice of using the definition of "permanent establishment" as the interna-
tional parameter for business contact was first formulated by the Fiscal Committee
of the League of Nations in the 1940s. The definition of permanent establishment
was further developed through negotiations of bilateral treaties and was crystal-
lized in the OECD Draft Model Convention of 1963. U.N. DEPARTMENT OF IN-
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argue that the current network of bilateral tax treaties are biased against
them.2 2 3 As e-commerce transactions become more substantial, the reve-
nue losses suffered by the source or market country will escalate with the
continued use of prevailing permanent establishment rules. The poorest
countries of the world will be the ones that will tend to incur the greatest
losses as a result of the continued use of the permanent establishment
concept.
2 2 4
V. THE INTEGRATIVE TASK OF WEAVING A
CONTINENTAL TRADE WEB
NAFTA is predicated on a continental web of interdependent princi-
ples and objectives. 225 The Free Trade Agreement strives to promote
mutuality of benefits for all parties through harmonized rules dealing
with tangible and intangible goods and services. 226 Electronic commerce
provides a mechanism for moving economic activity closer to some of the
ideals of perfect competition, including low transaction costs, reduced
barriers to entry, improved consumer access to information, and elimina-
tion of time and distance as barriers to trade.227 While electronic com-
merce successfully complements many elements of international trade, it
also creates new problems never previously encountered or envisaged by
free trade negotiators.
NAFTA needs to respond to the challenges of the digital age by imple-
menting a series of reforms. The NAFTA Member States must start by
acknowledging the need for greater tax policy coordination, particularly
in connection with electronic commerce. As the first decade of NAFTA
TERNATIONAL ECONOMICS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, GUIDELINES FOR TAX TREATIES
BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 14 (1974).
223. See Forgione, supra note 10, at 761-64.
224. In so far as most large multinational corporations and major capital owners are
resident or based in developed or industrialized countries, the shift from source
country taxation of income to residence country taxation of income will corre-
spondingly lead to a transfer or foregoing of revenues from capital-importing
countries to capital-exporting nations. Tax authorities in India recently confirmed
that the application of the permanent establishment norm in an e-commerce envi-
ronment "does not ensure certainty of tax burden and maintenance of the existing
equilibrium in sharing of tax revenues between countries of residence and source".
INDIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE, supra note 221, at 11.
225. NAFI'A promotes the concepts of mutual advantage and harmonization of treat-
ment as fundamental components of the reciprocal trade relations of the signato-
ries to the Free Trade Agreement. The Preamble to NAFTA states that the Parties
to the Agreement are resolved to, among other things: "Establish clear and mutu-
ally advantageous rules governing their trade; Ensure a predictable commercial
framework for business planning and investment." NAFTA, supra note 1.
226. The FTAA may strive for the same objectives as NAFTA, but it would be pre-
sumptuous to believe that the FTAA can promise the same level of integration for
goods and services currently enjoyed under NAFTA. Consider, "A major element
of the trade agenda for the next decade will be the task of extending the world
trading regime beyond trade in goods to include trade in services, trade-related
investment issues, and the mushrooming information sector." Cunningham, supra
note 180, at 384.
227. Willingham, supra note 5, at 487.
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comes to a close, there is increasing evidence that the interconnectedness
of the trade and capital markets governed by NAFTA will exploit the
deficiencies and expose the differences of the respective tax regimes of
the Member States. 228 The lack of harmonization of taxation measures
amongst Canada, Mexico, and the United States will undoubtedly present
administrative difficulties, avoidance opportunities, and establish artifi-
cial biases that could potentially counteract the trade liberalization fea-
tures of the Free Trade Agreement. NAFTA should introduce a
framework that establishes basic taxation principles for the treatment of
international trade and investment income. This first step would involve
the extension of the trade principles of National Treatment and Most Fa-
vored Nation Treatment to tax measures. 229 The underlying objective of
integrating a general tax framework into the Free Trade Agreement
would be the furtherance of the principles of mutual gain and harmoniza-
tion of treatment espoused throughout NAFTA.
The next move towards integration of tax and trade policies within
NAFTA involves recognition of the need to reduce reliance on bilateral
tax treaties involving two Member States. Tax revenues represent one of
the most important benefits a nation receives from foreign investment
and trade within its territory. Unlike NAFTA, bilateral tax treaties do
not purport to pursue mutual advantage for its contracting parties. Na-
tions are naturally motivated by revenue interests and other concerns
when negotiating a bilateral treaty, and accordingly, treaty partners
should not be expected to agree upon the most mutually advantageous
treaty provision.230 The allocation of tax jurisdiction in a bilateral treaty
constitutes a fiscal transfer mechanism between nations. The assignment
of primary tax jurisdiction to one country will result in the loss of tax
revenue to the other treaty partner. In practice, bilateral tax treaties not
only upset the pre-treaty equilibrium of shared tax revenues, they shift
the fiscal balance in favour of the more economically advanced treaty
partner. The existing scheme of most bilateral tax treaties gives rise to
the anomalous result of tax revenues flowing from capital-importing
countries, such as Mexico, to capital-exporting countries, such as the
United States.
The growth of electronic commerce serves to exacerbate the shortcom-
ings of prevailing tax treaty norms. Any substantive move towards tax
228. See Cockfield, supra note 4, at 69 (arguing that the "adoption of more comprehen-
sive measures, including some tax uniformity among the Member States, will thus
become a more attractive alternative in the long term.").
229. Some sections of NAFTA already make reference to the extension of National
Treatment provisions to certain tax measures, such as in respect of the perform-
ance of cross-border services. See NAFTA, supra note 1, article 2103(4)(a).
230. The negotiation of bilateral tax treaty provisions appears not to be motivated by
any principle of mutual gain as much as it is driven by the fiscal demands of taxing
nations. Where income is derived by a resident of one country from sources in a
foreign country, and if both countries assert a legitimate claim to tax that income,
then either country may view an agreement to grant the other the primary right to
tax that income as a loss of tax revenue.
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integration within NAFTA should be accompanied by international tax
reforms. Trading nations must recognize that the fiscal losses incurred by
e-commerce market countries are likely to contribute to greater techno-
logical disparity unless properly addressed through a series of trade and
tax reforms.231 If the digital divide in North America is to be bridged, the
integration of tax rules into NAFTA should ensure that new tax norms
allow source or market countries to reap some of the fiscal benefits of
electronic commerce and foreign investment.
The integration of tax rules into a multilateral trade, investment, and
tax agreement involving Canada, Mexico, and the United States would go
a long way towards resolving the NAFTA objective of harmonization of
treatment. Multilateral trade pacts purport to adopt a holistic approach
that may effectively bridge the disparity of economic relations between
developed and developing countries. The implementation of tax mea-
sures in a multilateral trade agreement infers the abandonment of the
bilateral tax conventions between NAFTA parties. The move towards
multilateral tax agreements represents the natural evolution of interna-
tional tax reforms. Bilateral tax treaties are dinosaurs in an age where
increasingly greater emphasis is placed on multilateral agreements. 232 Bi-
lateral treaty negotiations are not conducive to the adoption of uniform
and harmonious rules involving more than two parties. 233
The continental Free Trade Agreement should compel North American
governments to treat e-commerce transactions in the same manner as
conventional commerce. 234 At its most basic level, NAFTA could bring
e-commerce within its fold by declaring that purely digital transactions
are to be treated akin to sales and transfers of tangible goods and ser-
vices. However, the key to adopting a uniform approach in NAFTA to-
wards e-commerce will depend on whether such a declaration is
accompanied by tax measures designed to accommodate the fiscal inter-
231. Severe technological disparities between the countries of the Americas currently
represents a huge impediment to continental trade and the disparity is expected to
escalate unless addressed. "By the time the FTAA is formed in 2005, the Internet
will be far advanced and electronic commerce will be far more important than it is
today [but developing countries'] lack of technology creates a barrier to trade in
the global marketplace and will hamper the growth towards true global electronic
commerce." Willingham, supra note 5, at 507.
232. "In many ways, tax treaties are like dinosaurs in the modem world of international
trade. They are bilateral in a world of multilateral trade agreements, and they takejust short of forever to conclude." Mitchell, supra note 58, at 210.
233. The analysis of the pertinent tax conventions of the NAFTA Member States set
out in this article supports the proposition that bilateral tax treaties often fail to
provide congruence with the objectives of multilateral trade agreements. Even
though negotiations in respect of the Canada-Mexico Convention, the U.S.-Mexico
Convention and certain parts of the Canada-U.S. Convention took place within a
short time period, there is alarming diversity among these conventions in respect
of the treatment accorded certain types of income.
234. See Graetz, supra note 112, at 1363 (noting that international tax neutrality is an
essential feature of government domestic and foreign policies because of its pro-
motion of worldwide economic efficiencies). Forgione, supra note 10, at 746-47
(arguing that international tax principles require authorities to treat e-commerce
transactions in the same manner as conventional business transactions).
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ests of the least technologically advanced of the Member States, namely,
Mexico. Any realistic accommodation of electronic commerce would in-
volve the abandonment of the permanent establishment concept as the
nexus for income taxation.235 The adoption of a market or consumption
based standard for taxation of e-commerce transactions would likely
moderate the tax revenue equilibrium within North America.236
The gradual integration of tax rules into NAFTA will enhance the ben-
efits of liberalized trade and promote the objectives of mutual gain and
harmonization of treatment proclaimed by the Free Trade Agreement.
The gradual integration of tax rules under the auspices of a comprehen-
sive and multilateral North American Free Trade Agreement at first
blush appears to challenge the notion of the tax sovereignty. The reality,
though, is that tax integration does not necessarily detract from the fiscal
independence of NAFTA's Member States any differently that the inter-
act of the trade pact and commercial laws enacted by states, provinces
and regions. If the NAFTA Member States are concerned about the na-
tional sovereignty implications of pursuing an effective tax integration
strategy, then it is possible for sovereignty concerns to be addressed by
assurances that tax rates, subnational taxation and special tax measures
will be excluded from the extension of the integrative scope of NAFTA.
The practical reality of the NAFTA countries concluding a multilateral
tax arrangement satisfactory to each of them will be influenced by a vari-
ety of factors. The issue of resolving tax claims and entitlements to tax
revenues may be the most contentious of all issues and the most difficult
to resolve.237 The key issue might come down to whether the United
235. To reiterate the argument, bilateral tax treaties restrict the jurisdiction of the
source country to tax income derived by foreign e-commerce vendors by stipulat-
ing that a sufficient nexus must be established in order to permit taxation in the
source country. So, if an e-commerce business resident in the United States makes
digital sales to Mexican buyers without establishing a permanent establishment in
Mexico, then according to the Mexico-U.S. tax treaty, the Mexico government will
be precluded from taxing the income of the U.S. enterprise derived from its sales
into Mexico. In the absence of the tax treaty, the U.S. enterprise would be subject
to taxation in Mexico on the income that it derived from its Mexican sales. The tax
treaty provision for taxing the business profits of a foreign enterprise represents a
negotiated departure from the status quo established under domestic tax rules. It
is possible to insert text in NAFTA that establishes a nexus for the taxation of
business profits within North America that is distinct from the treaty norm of per-
manent establishment and the respective domestic standards of each Member
State.
236. Government officials may have to consider the possibility that clauses in existing
tax conventions involving non-NAFTA treaty partners could require reciprocity.
For instance, the existence of a Most-Favored Nation Treatment provision in a
bilateral tax convention involving a Member State could lead to the extension of
the NAFTA tax treatment of e-commerce (such as, the proposed abandonment of
the permanent establishment definition) to non-NAFTA partners. In such in-
stances, tax authorities may have to consider the viability of renegotiation of non-
NAFTA tax treaties.
237. It may mean abandoning treaty provisions that are skewered in favour of capital-
exporting nations and replacing them with new measures that ensure that all coun-
tries receive an equitable share of tax revenues and other benefits from interna-
tional trade and investment. Increased source country taxation and high
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States Treasury is prepared to forego any gained advantage under the
bilateral tax treaties in order to become a party to a multilateral agree-
ment that would encourage freer trade in a wide array of goods and ser-
vices, including digital products. The United States may be willing to
consider an integrated tax and trade arrangement if it believes that a mul-
tilateral tax convention will further the U.S. policy objective of global
trade liberalization and promote the basic tenets of NAFTA.238
NAFTA was heralded as the beginning of a new era of economic coop-
eration and trade amongst nations. The Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas presents a further window of opportunity to achieve goals that
were previously considered unattainable. However, in order for the less
developed countries of the South to engage in fair and mutually re-
warding trade with the wealthy nations of the North, it will be necessary
to discard the tax rules and norms that act as barriers to economic devel-
opment. A multilateral tax treaty could be formulated utilizing prevailing
treaty norms with modifications that promote the objectives of the under-
lying trade agreement. 239 Such a multilateral tax agreement would have
the immediate benefit of harmonization and, depending on the determi-
nation of the rates of withholding tax and the ratio or formula for appor-
tionment of business profits the agreement could also further the
objective of mutual advantage. The web of complex integrated tax and
trade rules will not be easy to weave, but the promise of free trade across
the World Wide Web should undoubtedly inspire the process.
withholding tax rates could, in turn, serve as impediments to free trade. The key
would be to attain a balance that recognizes the importance of tax neutrality and
applies capital-import neutrality principles to certain income sources such as the
taxation of active business income and capital-export neutrality principles to other
forms of income (such as in respect of the taxation of cross-border royalty
payments).
238. The potential for U.S. economic dominance of the hemispheric free trade agenda
is a real concern. See Guy Poitras, The Potential for U.S. Economic Dominance, 6
NAFrA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. 389 (2000) (noting that the United States has long
championed a Pan American vision of a liberal, democratic capitalist hemisphere
based on the principles of economic unity and integration). The role of the United
States in NA-rA, while still huge and hegemonic, may be more open to accept-
ance of tax integration within an inclusive e-commerce framework. The United
States would probably also be inclined to use the opportunity of a separate
NAFYA taxation agreement to promote its transfer pricing rules and, possibly, to
open the door to the development of a formulary apportionment system for inter-
national income.
239. The residence country bias of the existing treaty network can be modified by ad-
justing the rates of withholding tax and the apportionment formula to increase the
flow of revenues to poor countries. In order for a multilateral tax treaty to suc-
ceed, the governing principle in the negotiation process must be the fair sharing of
international income tax revenues. The establishment of a multilateral tax treaty
binding all of the parties to NAFTA would establish consistent sourcing rules, a
unified set of withholding rates, and hopefully, clear and equitable roles for appor-
tioning the commercial profits of multinational enterprises.
